Optimal alcohol taxation: Simulation results for Estonia

Saar, Indrek

doi:10.1080/1406099x.2011.10840491

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 11 publications

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“…Finally, for labour supply elasticity with respect to income η LI , we use the value of η LI = -0.1, which is also applied in both Saar (2011) and Parry et al (2009).…”

Section: Elasticities and Marginal Efficiency Gainmentioning

confidence: 99%

A General Equilibrium Model of Optimal Alcohol Taxation in the Czech Republic

Janda¹,

Lajksnerová²,

Mikolášek³

2019

Prague Economic Papers

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This paper provides a general equilibrium theoretical model of alcohol taxation and empirically estimates the model. For this purpose, we use a model determined by both externality corrections and fiscal considerations as the tax increase is assumed to immediately change other governmental policies such as labour taxation or medical expenditures. The results of our analysis show that under most parametric scenarios, the current Czech tax rate on beer and wine is below its optimal level and that the fiscal component has a significant impact on the optimal level of tax.

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“…Finally, for labour supply elasticity with respect to income η LI , we use the value of η LI = -0.1, which is also applied in both Saar (2011) and Parry et al (2009).…”

Section: Elasticities and Marginal Efficiency Gainmentioning

confidence: 99%

A General Equilibrium Model of Optimal Alcohol Taxation in the Czech Republic

Janda¹,

Lajksnerová²,

Mikolášek³

2019

Prague Economic Papers

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An Optimal-Tax Approach to Alcohol Policy

Aronsson¹,

Sjögren²

2010

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This paper deals with optimal income and commodity taxation in an economy, where alcohol is an externality-generating consumption good. In our model, alcohol can be bought domestically, imported, or produced illegally. Border trade alone implies an incentive to set the domestic alcohol tax below the marginal social damage of alcohol, and to tax (subsidize) commodities that are complementary with (substitutable for) alcohol. The income tax will also be used as a corrective instrument. Furthermore, although the effects of adding illegal production are ambiguous in general, a realistic outcome is, nevertheless, that it reduces both the optimal alcohol tax and the marginal income tax rate.

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Assessing the impacts of alcohol policies

Cecchini

Devaux

Sassi

2015

OECD Health Working Papers

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OECD Working Papers should not be reported as representing the official views of the OECD or of its member countries. The opinions expressed and arguments employed are those of the author(s). Working Papers describe preliminary results or research in progress by the author(s) and are published to stimulate discussion on a broad range of issues on which the OECD works. Comments on Working Papers are welcomed, and may be sent to the Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs OECD,

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Optimal alcohol taxation: Simulation results for Estonia

Cited by 4 publications

References 11 publications

A General Equilibrium Model of Optimal Alcohol Taxation in the Czech Republic

A General Equilibrium Model of Optimal Alcohol Taxation in the Czech Republic

An Optimal-Tax Approach to Alcohol Policy

Assessing the impacts of alcohol policies

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