2016
DOI: 10.1145/2910577
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Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values

Abstract: We study interdependent value settings [Milgrom and Weber 1982] and extend several fundamental results from the well-studied independent private values model to these settings. For revenue-optimal mechanism design, we give conditions under which Myerson's virtual value-based mechanism remains optimal with interdependent values. One of these conditions is robustness of the truthfulness and individual rationality guarantees, in the sense that they are required to hold ex post. We then consider an even more robus… Show more

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Cited by 26 publications
(40 citation statements)
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“…We focus on deterministic and anonymous mechanisms, as they are optimal for interdependent values of fully rational agents (Ausubel, 1999;Maskin and Siebert, 1992;Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016). We extend the cursed-equilibrium model of Eyster and Rabin (2005) to support a strong truthfulness notion of Cursed ex-post incentive-compatible (C-EPIC), the equivalent of ex-post IC in the case of fully rational agents, which is the strongest incentive notion possible for this setting 1 (see Section 3.1).…”
Section: Our Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…We focus on deterministic and anonymous mechanisms, as they are optimal for interdependent values of fully rational agents (Ausubel, 1999;Maskin and Siebert, 1992;Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016). We extend the cursed-equilibrium model of Eyster and Rabin (2005) to support a strong truthfulness notion of Cursed ex-post incentive-compatible (C-EPIC), the equivalent of ex-post IC in the case of fully rational agents, which is the strongest incentive notion possible for this setting 1 (see Section 3.1).…”
Section: Our Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, there is a large literature, including Wilson (1969);Milgrom and Weber (1982); Klemperer (1998); Bulow and Klemperer (2002); Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen (2016), studying the interdependent valuation auction, the type of auctions we consider in this paper. Different from our work which designs mechanism for agents who suffer the winner's curse, these papers consider the mechanism design for fully rational agents who play (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium strategies.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
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