Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition

Chen, Yanlin; Hu, Audrey; Zhang, Jun

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2024.02.003

Games and Economic Behavior

2024

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.02.003

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Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition

Yanlin Chen,

Audrey Hu,

Jun Zhang

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Using Blockchain Technology to Combat Counterfeits: The Optimal Pricing Scheme of Two Competitive Platforms

Li,

Wang,

et al. 2024

JTAER

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This paper investigates using blockchain technology to fight deceptive counterfeits in an electronic commerce environment. Thereby, a two-period pricing model is built under two competitive platforms: a blockchain-based platform which ensures product authentication and provides a higher value to customers but increases customers’ privacy concerns, and its rival (i.e., the traditional platform) in the absence of blockchain implementation which is perceived as having a lower value due to the existence of deceptive counterfeits and thus faces more government enforcement. Customers on both platforms are influenced by the electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM) effect, and customers value a platform more if the platform has more online sales. The two platforms either adopt the fixed pricing scheme or the modifiable pricing scheme and so four possible cases may occur. By deriving the equilibrium of each possible case, we analytically find that the attenuation of consumer privacy concerns, increases in government enforcement efforts, and eWOM can benefit the platform’s adoption of blockchain technology to combat counterfeits, and a strong eWOM effect is conducive to consumers but deteriorates price competition and thus harms both platforms. Whether the pricing schemes enhance the competitiveness of the blockchain-based platform over its rivals depends on the eWOM effect and the advantage gained from adopting blockchain technology.

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Using Blockchain Technology to Combat Counterfeits: The Optimal Pricing Scheme of Two Competitive Platforms

Li,

Wang,

et al. 2024

JTAER

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

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Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition

Cited by 1 publication

References 30 publications

Using Blockchain Technology to Combat Counterfeits: The Optimal Pricing Scheme of Two Competitive Platforms

Using Blockchain Technology to Combat Counterfeits: The Optimal Pricing Scheme of Two Competitive Platforms

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