2024
DOI: 10.3982/te4259
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs

Mengxi Zhang

Abstract: I investigate the design of effort‐maximizing mechanisms when agents have both private information and convex effort costs, and the designer has a fixed prize budget. I first demonstrate that it is always optimal for the designer to utilize a contest with as many participants as possible. Further, I identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the winner‐takes‐all prize structure to be optimal. When this condition fails, the designer may prefer to award multiple prizes of descending sizes. I also provide … Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

0
0
0

Year Published

2024
2024
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
2
1
1

Relationship

0
4

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 4 publications
references
References 25 publications
0
0
0
Order By: Relevance