Optimal Control of Networked Evolutionary Games With Bankruptcy Risk

Xin-ling, LI; Deng, Lei; Zhao, Jianli

doi:10.1109/access.2020.3008198

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 29 publications

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“…Fu et al used the method of game theory to propose sufficient conditions to avoid enterprises' bankruptcy [9]. Li et al used the game method to study the optimal control problem of enterprises on the verge of bankruptcy and liquidation and discussed the critical condition of enterprise's bankruptcy [10].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mechanism Analysis of Strategy Choice of Bankruptcy Reorganization Participants under Government Incentive Mechanism

Zhao

Song

2022

Complexity

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This study constructs an evolutionary game model of government, creditors, investors, and enterprises participating in bankruptcy reorganization, analyzes the strategy selection mechanism of the four parties under the government incentive mechanism, systematically analyzes the strategy selection process of each participant, discusses the effectiveness of government incentives in promoting the bankruptcy reorganization process, and finds out the stable point in the replication dynamic system. Finally, MATLAB 2018 software is used to numerically model the influence of key elements of the system. The research shows that under the government’s incentive mechanism, creditors participate in bankruptcy reorganization in the form of debt-to-equity swaps, investors participate in bankruptcy reorganization in the form of providing high-quality assets, and enterprises participate in bankruptcy reorganization in the form of reform and transformation which is a stable strategy to replicate the dynamic system; the strategy of the enterprises will affect the strategy choice of creditors and investors; the completion of bankruptcy reorganization is inseparable from the government’s incentives, and the government’s strategy will directly affect the strategic choice of enterprises; and the government’s support and constraint strength satisfy the following quantitative relationship: when M1>S3–C1 and L1>B1–C1, it can better promote the bankruptcy and reorganization process.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mechanism Analysis of Strategy Choice of Bankruptcy Reorganization Participants under Government Incentive Mechanism

Zhao

Song

2022

Complexity

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Weighted Networked Evolutionary Games with Switched Topologies and Time-delay Threshold

Wu,

Ma,

Dang

et al. 2023

2023 42nd Chinese Control Conference (CCC)

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Matrix-Based Method for the Analysis and Control of Networked Evolutionary Games: A Survey

Yang

Geng

2023

Games

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In this paper, a detailed survey is presented for the analysis and control of networked evolutionary games via the matrix method. The algebraic form of networked evolutionary games is firstly recalled. Then, some existing results on networked evolutionary games are summarized. Furthermore, several generalized forms of networked evolutionary games are reviewed, including networked evolutionary games with time delay, networked evolutionary games with bankruptcy mechanism, networked evolutionary games with time-varying networks, and random evolutionary Boolean games. The computational complexity of general networked evolutionary games is still challenging, which limits the application of the matrix method to large-scale networked evolutionary games. Future works are finally presented in the conclusion.

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Optimal Control of Networked Evolutionary Games With Bankruptcy Risk

Cited by 3 publications

References 29 publications

Mechanism Analysis of Strategy Choice of Bankruptcy Reorganization Participants under Government Incentive Mechanism

Mechanism Analysis of Strategy Choice of Bankruptcy Reorganization Participants under Government Incentive Mechanism

Weighted Networked Evolutionary Games with Switched Topologies and Time-delay Threshold

Matrix-Based Method for the Analysis and Control of Networked Evolutionary Games: A Survey

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