Optimal Cyber-Defense Strategies for Advanced Persistent Threats: A Game Theoretical Analysis

Acquaviva, Jeffrey; Mahon, Mark; Einfalt, Bruce; LaPorta, Thomas F.

doi:10.1109/srds.2017.29

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Ресурсами оборонця можуть бути інфраструктура безпеки (брандмауери), фінанси та підготовка кадрів. Наприклад, адміністратор мережі може шукати таке розміщення ресурсів, при якому мінімізуються ризики кібератак (нападів) і водночас витрати захисту від кібератак [13]. Нападник має обмежені ресурси і зазнає ризику бути відстеженим і покараним.…”

Section: моделі взаємодій між нападниками і оборонцями у кіберпросторіunclassified

Теоретико-Ігрові Та Оптимізаційні Моделі І Методи Підвищення Безпеки Кіберінфраструктур

Горбачук¹,

Golotsukov²,

Dunaievskyi³

et al. 2022

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Critical infrastructure of interdependent modern sectors is increasingly relying on cyber systems and cyber infrastructures, which are characterized by growing risks of their cyber components, including cyberphysical subsystems. Therefore, cybersecurity is important for the protection of critical infrastructure. The search for cost-effective ways to increase or improve the security of cyber infrastructure is based on optimization models and methods of cyber infrastructure stability, safety, and reliability. These models and methods have different fields of application and different directions, not necessarily focused on the cyber infrastructure resilience. The growing role of information and communication technologies has influenced the concept of security and the nature of war. Many critical infrastructures (airports, hospitals, oil pipelines) have become potentially vulnerable to organized cyber attacks. Today, the implementation of the major state function of defense and security largely depends on the successful use of information and communication technologies as modern competitive (final and intermediate) dual-use products used by different people for different purposes. Game theory is increasingly used to assess strategic interactions between attackers and defenders in cyberspace. Game research and modeling combinations are combined to study the security of cyberspace. In cyberspace, the arsenal of weapons is built by finding more vulnerabilities in the defense of the target. Vulnerability is a weakness in the security procedures of the system, the design of the system or its implementation, as well as in the organization of internal control, which may be used by the source of the threat. The dynamic nature of vulnerabilities means that they are constantly changing over time. Detecting a vulnerability by a defender reduces the effectiveness of the attacker’s cyber weapon, which exploits the vulnerability, and increases the target protection. Game theory has been applied to many issues, including resource allocation, network security, and human cooperation. In cyberspace, there is often a placement game where the attacker and the defender decide where to allocate their respective resources. Defender’s resources can be security infrastructure (firewalls), finance, training. For example, a network administrator might look for a resource allocation that minimizes the risk of (cyber) attacks and at the same time protects against cyberattacks. The attacker has limited resources and is at risk of being tracked down and punished. The problem of resource allocation in cyberspace can be formulated as a game-theoretic problem, taking into account the concept of common knowledge and the problem of uncertain observability.

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Section: моделі взаємодій між нападниками і оборонцями у кіберпросторіunclassified