Optimal Decision of Deferred Payment Supply Chain considering Bilateral Risk-Aversion Degree

With the sustainable development of the global economy, environmental problems and the green economy are increasingly becoming points of concern for the community. However, the large amount of capital invested in green technology and the high price of green products have become the key problems hindering the development of a risk-averse green supply chain. In order to promote the supply chain to increase green investment level, improve the green degree of products, and reduce the impact of risk aversion on green investment, this paper studies a two-echelon green supply chain composed of a risk-averse manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer, in which the retailer is the leader and the manufacturer is the follower. We construct the wholesale price contract model, cost-sharing contract model, and two-part contract model, respectively, and use the Optimization Theory and Methods to discuss the impact of the three contracts on the green degree, expected utility of supply chain, retail price, consumer surplus, and social welfare. The results show that in the cost-sharing contract, compared with the wholesale price contract, the green degree of the product has been significantly improved, but the expected utility of the supply chain enterprises cannot achieve Pareto improvement, and the higher consumer environmental awareness will cause the manufacturer’s expected utility to decline. In the two-part tariff contract, compared with the wholesale price contract, the expected utility of supply chain enterprises achieves Pareto improvement, and the green degree of products is the highest in the three contracts; more importantly, in the two-part contract, the product green degree, the retail price, and the expected utility of the supply chain are not related to the manufacturer’s risk aversion; meanwhile, the retail price in the two-part tariff is the lowest among the three contracts, and the consumer surplus and social welfare are the highest. Our main contribution is that the two-part contract eliminates the influence of the manufacturer’s risk aversion on the above decision variable and realizes the unification of manufacturers, retailers, consumers, and social benefits. Finally, this paper uses numerical examples to verify the above conclusions and then analyzes the sensitivity of the supply chain system.

“…We can see that in the centralized supply chain, the optimal decision variable is not related to the risk aversion of the manufacturer, which is in line with Liang et al [58].…”

Section: Centralized Supply Chain Decision Modelsupporting

confidence: 88%

Green Investment Decision and Coordination in a Retailer-Dominated Supply Chain Considering Risk Aversion

Bai

Wang

2022

“…Solving the trust problem of collaborative process execution through blockchain smart contracts does not require the involvement of any intermediary. Related research on supply chain risk aversion is mainly carried out by using mean-variance analysis [10], value at risk (VaR) [11,12], and conditional value at risk (CVaR) [13][14][15][16]. The risk measurement technology of CVaR, as proposed by Rockefeller et al [17,18], can not only simplify the calculation method of CVaR, but also effectively measure the average return below a certain threshold.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Risk Avoidance and Coordination of Supply Chain Subject Based on Blockchain Technology

Liu

Futou

2019

Based on the influence of block chain technology on information sharing among supply chain participants, mean-CVaR (conditional value at risk) is used to characterize retailers’ risk aversion behavior, while a Stackelberg game is taken to study the optimal decision-making of manufacturers and retailers during decentralized and centralized decision-making processes. Finally, the mean-CVaR-based revenue-sharing contract is used to coordinate the supply chain and profit distribution. The research shows that, under the condition of decentralized decision-making, when the retailer’s optimal order quantity is low, it is an increasing function of the weighted proportion and the risk aversion degree, while, when the retailer’s optimal order quantity is high, it is an increasing function of the weighted proportion, and has nothing to do with the risk aversion degree. The manufacturer’s blockchain technology application degree is a reduction function of the weighted proportion. When the retailer’s order quantity is low, the manufacturer’s blockchain technology application degree is a decreasing function of risk aversion, while, when the retailer’s order quantity is high, the manufacturer’s blockchain technology application is independent of risk aversion. The profit of the supply chain system under centralized decision-making is higher than that of decentralized decision-making. The revenue sharing contract can achieve the coordination of the supply chain to the level of centralized decision-making. Through blockchain technology, transaction costs among members of the supply chain can be reduced, information sharing can be realized, and the benefits of the supply chain can be improved. Finally, the specific numerical simulation is adopted to analyze the weighted proportion, risk aversion and the impact of blockchain technology on the supply chain, and verify the relevant conclusions.

“…Jiang et al [32] studied the influence of government subsidy policy on manufacturers' low carbon behavior. Liang et al [33] explored the impact of government subsidies and risk aversion on supply chain members. In recent years, some scholars studied the dual-channel low-carbon supply chain.…”

Section: Low Carbon Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Allocation of the Carbon Emission Abatement Target in Low Carbon Supply Chain Considering Power Structure

Huang

Han

et al. 2023

The proposal of China’s dual carbon strategy is not only a kind of pressure but also an opportunity for enterprises. Both upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain pay more attention to carbon emission reduction, and consumers are gradually turning to a low-carbon preference. How carbon reduction targets are allocated among supply chain members with different technical efficiency and market opportunities will directly affect supply chain performance and social welfare. Power structure is an important factor that dominates the decision-making of the supply chain, so we establish the low-carbon supply chain model under three different power structures: manufacturer-led, retailer-led, and power pairs between two parties. We study the government distribution decisions of carbon emissions reduction targets under different supply chain power structures and discuss the influence of supply chain power structures on carbon emissions reduction distribution decisions and social welfare. The study found that if the carbon emissions reduction target increases, the government will adjust the allocation strategy to increase the proportion of enterprises whose emissions cuts have less impact on market demand. The study also found that the government will allocate more emissions reduction to enterprises with higher emissions reduction efficiency, and enterprises whose emissions reductions have a greater impact on market demand. When supply chain enterprises have equal power, the supply chain will have greater social welfare and market demand, but not necessarily greater supply chain profits.