Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations

Nitzan, Shmuel; Paroush, Jacob

doi:10.2307/2526438

Cited by 262 publications

(174 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…When resolving a disagreement, the arbitrator would have to compare their own decision and confidence with those of their partner. Importantly, to make the most accurate judgments, the weight assigned to each member should be informed by the reliability of their individual responses (27,28). To learn this information, the arbitrator must dynamically track the history of trial outcomes (29).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Lastly, a wealth of research on "homophily" in human social networks (39) suggests that our tendency for associating and bonding with similar others may exploit the benefits of an equality bias. However, when a wide competence gap separates group members, the normative strategy requires that each opinion is weighted by its reliability (28). In such situations, an equality bias can be damaging for the group.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Equality bias impairs collective decision-making across cultures

Mahmoodi

Bang

Olsen

et al. 2015

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

123

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We tend to think that everyone deserves an equal say in a debate. This seemingly innocuous assumption can be damaging when we make decisions together as part of a group. To make optimal decisions, group members should weight their differing opinions according to how competent they are relative to one another; whenever they differ in competence, an equal weighting is suboptimal. Here, we asked how people deal with individual differences in competence in the context of a collective perceptual decision-making task. We developed a metric for estimating how participants weight their partner's opinion relative to their own and compared this weighting to an optimal benchmark. Replicated across three countries (Denmark, Iran, and China), we show that participants assigned nearly equal weights to each other's opinions regardless of true differences in their competence-even when informed by explicit feedback about their competence gap or under monetary incentives to maximize collective accuracy. This equality bias, whereby people behave as if they are as good or as bad as their partner, is particularly costly for a group when a competence gap separates its members.social cognition | joint decision-making | bias | equality

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Equality bias impairs collective decision-making across cultures

Mahmoodi

Bang

Olsen

et al. 2015

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

123

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…(See Gelfand and Solomon, 1973;Gillispie, 1972;Black, 1958;Grainger, 1956;Barry, 1969;Baker, 1967Baker, , 1975. See also recent extensions by Gelfand and Solomon, 1974, 1977Grofman, 1978Grofman, , 1979Grofman, , 1980aKlevorick and Rothschild, 1978;Nagel and Neef, 1975;Grofman, Owen and Feld, 1982;Grofman, Feld and Owen, 1984 forthcoming;Grofman and Owen, 1984 forthcoming;Nitzan and Paroush, 1982;Miller, 1980;and Pinkham and Urken, 1981). 3.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies

1984

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Consider a group of people confronted with a dichotomous choice (for example, a yes or no decision). Assume that we can characterize each person by a probability, pi, of making the 'better' of the two choices open to the group, such that we define 'better' in terms of some linear ordering of the alternatives. If individual choices are independent, and if the a priori likelihood that either of the two choices is correct is one half, we show that the group decision procedure that maximizes the likelihood that the group will make the better of the two choices open to it is a weighted voting rule that assigns weights, wi, such that Pi wi ~ log 1-ffi "We then examine the implications for optimal group choice of interdependencies among individual choices.

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“…The nonasymptotic part of Condorcet's statement is also not always valid (Nitzan and Paroush 1982;Ben-Yashar and Paroush 2000). For instance, Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000) calculated that the nonasymptotic part of Condorcet's statement is valid if the competence vector is (0.8, 0.7, 0.7), in which case the simple majority rule yields a probability 0.826 of correct choice.…”

Section: Introduction and Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem

Berend

Sapir

2005

Soc Choice Welfare

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Abstract. Consider a committee of experts dealing with dichotomous choice problem, where the correctness probabilities are all greater than 1 2 . We prove that, if a random subcommittee of odd size m is selected randomly, and entrusted to make a decision by majority vote, its probability of deciding correctly increases with m. This includes a result of Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000), who proved that a random subcommittee of size m ≥ 3 is preferable to a random single expert.

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Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations

Cited by 262 publications

References 4 publications

Equality bias impairs collective decision-making across cultures

Equality bias impairs collective decision-making across cultures

Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies

Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem

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