2014
DOI: 10.1155/2014/786803
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Optimal Decisions in a Single-Period Supply Chain with Price-Sensitive Random Demand under a Buy-Back Contract

Abstract: This paper studies a single-period supply chain with a buy-back contract under a Stackelberg game model, in which the supplier (leader) decides on the wholesale price, and the retailer (follower) responds to determine the retail price and the order quantity. We analytically investigate the decentralized retailer's optimal decision. Our results demonstrate that the retailer has a unique optimal simultaneous decision on the retail price and the order quantity, under a mild restriction on the demand distribution.… Show more

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Cited by 9 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…When Zhao et al (2014) analyzed the buyback model by studying the uncertainty level, they also analyzed the equilibrium when using buyback and non-buyback, but they did not use a Nash equilibrium solution for analysis, as we do. The paper most similar to our research is the work of Wang and Choi (2014), who studied the repurchase contract in a single cycle and showed that the supply chain has a unique Pareto-optimal solution. They also showed that when the Pareto equilibrium was reached, the supply chain would be coordinated.…”
Section: Literature Reviewsupporting
confidence: 55%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…When Zhao et al (2014) analyzed the buyback model by studying the uncertainty level, they also analyzed the equilibrium when using buyback and non-buyback, but they did not use a Nash equilibrium solution for analysis, as we do. The paper most similar to our research is the work of Wang and Choi (2014), who studied the repurchase contract in a single cycle and showed that the supply chain has a unique Pareto-optimal solution. They also showed that when the Pareto equilibrium was reached, the supply chain would be coordinated.…”
Section: Literature Reviewsupporting
confidence: 55%
“…We assume the condition of h ’( x ) >* 0, which is known as the increasing failure rate (IFR) condition; it imposes a very mild restriction on the demand distribution, as it can be satisfied by many distributions (e.g. uniform, normal, exponential and gamma with parameter restrictions) (Wang and Choi, 2014). The condition dhtrue(xtrue)dx+h2true(xtrue)>0 is implied by IFR condition.…”
Section: Decentralized Decision-making In the Supply Chainmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our research is motivated by the defciency of results. On the other hand, there are several studies that analyzed the supply chain considering random demand, but these studies did not consider the characteristics of production-time-dependent products [28][29][30][31][32]. In this paper, we analyze the supply chain considering both random demand and production-timedependent product characteristics, and this is the diference between our study and previous studies.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 74%
“…The two are no longer in a game state, but a community of interests, and the intermediary organization will represent the interests of farmers to negotiate with the leading chili enterprises. Under the interest connection mode of "pepper leading enterprises + intermediary organizations + farmers", this paper only considers the game between intermediary organizations and pepper leading enterprises [5].…”
Section: Intermediary Organizationmentioning
confidence: 99%