Optimal Electricity Allocation Model Under China's Planning-Market Double-Track Mechanism Considering Bidding Game of Generation Companies

Abstract

In China, under the planning-market double-track mechanism implemented on the generation side of electricity, unreasonable market-oriented power generation proportion may lead to unnecessary vicious competition and market price changes, and it is against the will of power exchange (PX). Given this background, in this study, a bi-level model for planning-market electricity allocation that considers the bidding game of generation companies is proposed for a smooth transition of power system reform. In the upper level of the model, the proportion of planned electricity is optimized by PX to minimize the average social electricity purchase price. In the lower level of the model, considering the impact of market power on the bidding strategy of generation companies, the bidding strategy of generation companies set as price makers is proposed using the residual demand curve analysis method, while the price takers adopt the lowest bidding strategy. Simulations based on data from a provincial electricity market in China illustrate that the proposed model can effectively reflect the impact of market-oriented electricity proportion on market power and market-clearing price, thus providing a quantitative basis for PX to determine the proportion of market-oriented electricity in total electricity consumption.

Optimization Research on Provincial Users' Participation in Regional Electricity Spot Market Bidding Based on Hierarchically Gated Recurrent Neural Network

“…Every market participant has a single chance to bid during the actual monthly centralized bidding, wherein the clearing price will be matched by the market auctioneer. Regardless of their bid offers, the members accept the uniform pricing rule [15,16], this sends the energy volumes centrally and pays them at the same market clearing price [17,18].…”

Opinions on unbalanced funds in China’s electricity market

“…Unbalanced funds in China's electricity market also include planned unbalanced funds, congestion costs, compensation costs, deviation recovery fees etc. At present, the problem of unbalanced funds in China's electricity market is generally believed to be caused by the dual-track operation of China's command and market economic system (Cui et al, 2021;Liu et al, 2021). It is also the only way to go through the reform process of electricity marketization.…”

System Economy Improvement and Risk Shortening by Fuel Cell-UPFC Placement in a Wind-Combined System

“…Thermal units are allowed to participate in electricity markets on most provincial power markets, and renewables are set up with independent system operators (ISO) for electricity generation priority. A two-level model of planned market allocations for electricity is proposed in this study, which considers the generation company's bid-matching games to achieve smooth power system reform transitions [6].…”