Optimal enforcement of property rights on developing country forests subject to illegal logging

Clarke, Harry; Reed, William J.; Shrestha, Ram M.

doi:10.1016/0928-7655(93)90009-j

Cited by 51 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…While some researchers have considered incentives for illegal logging at the micro harvesting level (Boscolo and Vincent 2000, Clarke et al 1993), there is virtually no work that considers royalty reform in the presence of illegal logging, even though there have often been calls to raise royalty rates in the applied literature. Our approach here is closest to work in general public finance theory that considers government tax choices and the potential for tax evasion.…”

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confidence: 99%

Royalty reform and illegal reporting of harvest volumes under alternative penalty schemes

Amacher

Koskela

Ollikainen

2007

Environ Resource Econ

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Abstract:We study royalty reform in a framework where tax evasion or royalty non-payment through underreporting of harvesting is possible, under two alternative penalty schemes. By introducing a revenue-neutral change in royalty progression (or tax regression), we demonstrate several new findings for how actual and reported harvesting change. First, while higher royalty tax progression will always decrease actual harvesting, its effect on reported harvesting is sensitive to the penalty scheme imposed by the government. If the fine is levied on the evaded royalty payments, a rise in revenue-neutral royalty rate progression will increase reporting harvesting. But when the fine is levied on undeclared harvesting, the reverse happens -here, a tax-revenue neutral rise in a lump-sum royalty fee will decrease illegal reporting of harvesting and harvest income. Second, independently of the penalty scheme, an increase in revenue-neutral tax progression will decrease actual harvesting of the concession. The results are important in evaluating recent claims made in the forestry literature regarding reform in royalties for concessions-based forest economies.

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confidence: 99%

Royalty reform and illegal reporting of harvest volumes under alternative penalty schemes

Amacher

Koskela

Ollikainen

2007

Environ Resource Econ

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“…However, given the extremely weak judiciary and law enforcement, knowledge of laws and statutes may not provide real power in the courts, but rather may become useful in negotiations with companies. This is probably more viable than supporting local adat, especially if the NGOs involved are formed by people from the communities involved, with their own families' interests at stake (Clarke et al 1993). Some caution is warranted in a blanket embrace of NGOs as some may actually 'take advantage' of international support for local organisations.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

State, Communities and Forests in Contemporary Borneo

Cooke¹

2006

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“…2 It is in this last case that the institution of 2 Instances of partial enforcement appear in Helsley and Strange (1994), Milliman (1986), Sutinen and Anderson (1985), Clarke et al (1993) and Crabbé and Long (1993). private property will not be sufficient to prevent free access from occurring in equilibrium.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%