2008
DOI: 10.1086/533504
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Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy: Equivalence Results

Abstract: In this article, we analyze the implications of price-setting restrictions for the conduct of cyclical fiscal and monetary policy. We consider standard monetary economies that differ in the price-setting restrictions imposed on the firms. We show that, independently of the degree or type of price stickiness, it is possible to implement the same efficient set of allocations and that each allocation in that set is implemented with policies that are also independent of the price stickiness. In this sense, environ… Show more

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Cited by 124 publications
(97 citation statements)
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References 29 publications
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“…At the beginning of every period after observing the shock, sellers have to pay the cost   0 in terms of disutility to enter the second market. 10 The set of potential sellers is denoted F. Let S ⊆ F denote the set of sellers that pay the utility cost  to enter the second market. We assume that the set of potential sellers F is so large that S ⊂ F. Let  denote the measure of S. The set of households is denoted by H, whose size is normalized to 2.…”
Section: Free Entry and Search Frictionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…At the beginning of every period after observing the shock, sellers have to pay the cost   0 in terms of disutility to enter the second market. 10 The set of potential sellers is denoted F. Let S ⊆ F denote the set of sellers that pay the utility cost  to enter the second market. We assume that the set of potential sellers F is so large that S ⊂ F. Let  denote the measure of S. The set of households is denoted by H, whose size is normalized to 2.…”
Section: Free Entry and Search Frictionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our results rely on the assumption that fiscal policy is absent or impotent as an instrument to control entry. Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2008) show in monetary economies with sticky prices that the efficient allocation can be implemented if fiscal and monetary policies are chosen optimally. In our environment, if the government were to design the tax system such that all entry externalities are internalized, the Friedman rule would implement the first-best allocation.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such a concern can be justified by, for example, the results of Correia, Nicolini, and Teles (2002), who show in a sticky-price Ramsey model that a rich set of instruments can allow for the Friedman Rule to re-emerge, albeit as part of a non-generic policy. Such a conclusion carries over to our model as well -however, as we show, allowing for a wide range of natural instruments that could be used in the DM or the CM does not alter the basic prescription that DM activity should be taxed.…”
Section: Optimal Deviation From the Friedman Rulementioning
confidence: 99%
“…4 Examples of papers in the literature that optimize two or more tax instruments in the context of simpler NK models are Correia et al (2008) and Correia et al (2013), who use tax policy to neutralize price stickiness and to stimulate the economy at the zero lower bound, respectively.…”
Section: Equilibriummentioning
confidence: 99%