Optimal lot sizing in a non-cooperative material manager–controller game

Fandel, Günter; Trockel, Jan

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2010.12.008

Cited by 10 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…For detailed discussion, see e.g. Borch [19], Anderson and Young [3], Avenhaus, Von Stengel and Zamir [16], Fandel/Trockel [28], Fandel/Trockel [29,30]. Another direction of modification of inspection games is to consider the inspector as a Stackelberg leader of the game, see more e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inspection and crime prevention: an evolutionary perspective

Kolokoltsov,

Passi,

Yang

2013

Preprint

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In this paper, we analyse inspection games with an evolutionary perspective. In our evolutionary inspection game with a large population, each individual is not a rational payoff maximiser, but periodically updates his strategy if he perceives that other individuals' strategies are more successful than his own, namely strategies are subject to the evolutionary pressure. We develop this game into a few directions. Firstly, social norms are incorporated into the game and we analyse how social norms may influence individuals' propensity to engage in criminal behaviour. Secondly, a forward-looking inspector is considered, namely, the inspector chooses the level of law enforcement whilst taking into account the effect that this choice will have on future crime rates. Finally, the game is extended to the one with continuous strategy spaces.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inspection and crime prevention: an evolutionary perspective

Kolokoltsov,

Passi,

Yang

2013

Preprint

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“… 1. Oversight games have been applied to a variety of different contexts, such as arms control (Avenhaus, 2004), police control (Andreozzi, 2004), business administration (Fandel and Trockel, 2011), and smuggling (Hohzaki, 2011). …”

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confidence: 99%

Information accuracy in legislative oversight: Theoretical implications and experimental evidence

Shikano

Stoffel

Tepe

2017

Rationality and Society

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The relationship between legislatures and bureaucracies is typically modeled as a principal-agent game. Legislators can acquire information about the (non-) compliance of bureaucrats at some specific cost. Previous studies consider the information from oversight to be perfect, which contradicts most real-world applications. We therefore provide a model that includes random noise as part of the information. The quality of provided goods usually increases with information accuracy while simultaneously requiring less oversight. However, bureaucrats never provide high quality if information accuracy is below a specific threshold. We assess the empirical validity of our predictions in a lab experiment. Our data show that information accuracy is indeed an important determinant of both legislator and bureaucrat decision-making.

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