Optimal Planned Electricity Allocation Model for Power Exchange Under the Plan-Market Double-Track Mechanism

Abstract

The orderly deregulation of planned electricity generation and consumption is an important measure for electricity market reform in several countries (such as China), and a reasonable proportion of planned electricity in the total energy consumption is conducive to the smooth transition from the regulation mode to the market mode. Under the plan-market double-track mechanism (PMDM) implemented, a modified linear bidding function of generation companies (GCs) is first proposed, and the unified clearing price of unilateral generation market is determined accordingly. Second, considering the robust bidding strategies of generation companies, a bi-level optimal planned electricity allocation model for power exchange (PX) is constructed. In the upper level, the proportion of planned electricity is optimized by PX to minimize the CVaR of Lerner Index (LI), so as to maintain the market power at a low level. In the lower level, based on the robust optimization theory and the prediction of rival bidding, the bidding strategy of a GC is optimized by solving a specified max–min problem. Simulations based on data from a provincial electricity market in China illustrate that the market power can be reduced through a reasonable proportion of planned electricity designed by the PX. In addition, when more GCs tend to avoid a market risk, the proportion of planned electricity can be increased accordingly.

Stackelberg game-based optimal electricity trading method for distribution networks with small-micro industrial parks

“…On the other hand, an optimal trading electricity strategy can help the SMIPs to save the operating costs. Then, how to optimize the electricity trading between the DNs and SMIPs is currently a highly important issue (He et al, 2021).…”

Electricity market clearing for multiple stakeholders based on the Stackelberg game

“…As the electricity market (EM) continues to open up, operators and agents in the DNs gradually participate in the competition within the EM (He et al, 2021). As a user-side autonomous system, SMIPs can participate in power trading in the EM under the management of operators (Davoudi and Moeini-Aghtaie, 2022), which can deepen the hierarchical structure of the EM trading framework (Pownall et al, 2021).…”

Opinions on unbalanced funds in China’s electricity market

“…Unbalanced funds in foreign electricity markets (Dannecker, 2015; The European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity, 2021) generally include settlement deviation fees, metering deviation fees, rounding fees, costs and fines due to company bankruptcy or other reasons (Long et al, 2019;He et al, 2021). These unbalanced funds are usually small.…”