Optimal (R, Q) policy and pricing for two-echelon supply chain with lead time and retailer’s service-level incomplete information

Abstract

Many studies focus on inventory systems to analyze different real-world situations. This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain that includes one warehouse and one retailer with stochastic demand and an upto-level policy. The retailer's lead time includes the transportation time from the warehouse to the retailer that is unknown to the retailer. On the other hand, the warehouse is unaware of retailer's service level. The relationship between the retailer and the warehouse is modeled based on the Stackelberg game with incomplete information. Moreover, their relationship is presented when the warehouse and the retailer reveal their private information using the incentive strategies. The optimal inventory and pricing policies are obtained using an algorithm based on bi-level programming. Numerical examples, including sensitivity analysis of some key parameters, will compare the results between the Stackelberg models. The results show that information sharing is more beneficial to the warehouse rather than the retailer.

Performance indicators for supply chain resilience: review and conceptual framework

“…It is additionally stated that redundancy includes the duplication of limit with a specific end goal to proceed with operations amid a disappointment (Rice and Caniato 2003) and that it can along these lines likewise be viewed as a course to flexibility (Ehrenhuber et al 2015). Further, redundancy is like a buffer stoke; sometimes it can be expensive methods for building resilience because it accounted the holding cost (Esmaeili et al 2018). Although the firms use a different type of basic ways to cope with the weakness and develop the resilience, some time save limit is required and plays a vital role (Christopher and Holweg 2011).…”

Game theory in supply chain management: current trends and applications

“…Mahmoodi and Eshghi (2014) studied duopoly supply chains that face stochastic (i.e., uncertain) demand. Cachon and Zipkin (1999) studied a two-stage supply chain with stochastic demand while implementing inventory policies while Esmaeili et al (2018) modelled Stackelberg two-echelon supply chain with stochastic demand and inventory and pricing policies that satisfy retailer's service level (i.e., one warehouse and one retailer). Chen et al (2017a) analysed the impact of consumer demand, the manufacturing cost and the sales effort cost as uncertain variables on the pricing and effort decisions of a supply chain.…”

“…,Hafezalkotob et al (2015),Esmaeili et al (2016),,Qin et al (2017),Jena et al (2018),Kong et al (2017),Zhang and Hong (2017),Gao and You (2017),Genc and Giovanni (2017),Esmaeili et al (2018) andAli et al (2018). Various approaches are often used in integration while studying interactions which oftentimes require specific game models.…”

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“…LITERATURE REVIEW As per (Xia, et al 2017), price choices are a standout amongst the most vital choices of administration since it influences benefit and the organizations' arrival alongside their market aggressiveness. Accordingly, the errand of creating and characterizing prices is perplexing and testing, in light of the fact that the chiefs associated with this procedure must see how their clients see the prices, how to build up the apparent esteem, what are the natural and applicable expenses to consent to this need, and additionally consider the estimating goals of the organization and their focused position in the market (Esmaeili, et al 2018). Along these lines, (Zhang, et al 2017), contend that organizations which don't deal with their prices lose control over them, weakening their gainfulness and price adequacy essentially because of the clients will on paying a determinate price, which not exclusively does it rely upon the apparent esteem, yet in addition relies upon the prices set by the main rivals.…”