Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions

Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation

“…Proposition is a generalization of Proposition 5 in Carrasco et al (), where they have the result for a prior distribution with binary support (i.e., a mean constraint on the value distribution). When , the exponential price auction is essentially the randomized posted price mechanism in Proposition 5 of Carrasco et al () (cf. the last paragraph in the proof of Proposition ), with a slight difference that the price is distributed over instead of in their paper.…”

“…Proposition 1 is a generalization of Proposition 5 in Carrasco et al (2018), where they have the result for a prior distribution with binary support (i.e., a mean constraint on the value distribution). When N = 1, the exponential price auction is essentially the randomized posted price mechanism in Proposition 5 of Carrasco et al (2018) (cf. the last 8 Since π * > 0, G B(π * ) π * (π * ) = 0, and p(v ≤ s) > 0 for all s > 0, we have F(π * π * ) > 0.…”

“…When there is a single bidder (), the exponential price auction is an extension of the random posted price mechanism in Carrasco, Farinha Luz, Kos, Messner, Monteiro, and Moreira ( ). I prove that the exponential price auction gives the optimal revenue guarantee when , which generalizes a result in Carrasco et al () from binary value distribution to arbitrary distribution. Roesler and Szentes () characterized the optimal information structure for a buyer when the seller best responds to this information structure with a posted price.…”

Robust Reserve Pricing in Auctions Under Mean Constraints

“…There is much work that addresses robust design in auctions, such as Bergemann et al (2016), Bergemann et al (2019), Brooks and Du (2019), and Du (2018). 2 The papers closest to ours are: He and Li (2019), Suzdaltsev (2018), Kocyigit et al (2019), and Carrasco et al (2018). He and Li (2019) consider a similar second-price auction setting in which a seller is uncertain over the joint distribution of valuations but knows the full marginal distributions.…”

Strategic Inattention in Product Search

“…They investigate a situation where the seller observes the precision a buyer learns his valuation with. Carrasco et al (2017) develop optimal selling mechanisms given that the seller knows different numbers of first moments of the buyer's value distribution. Very close to our paper is the theory of Condorelli and Szentes (2016).…”