Optimal system design of supply chain finance based on game analysis

Meng, Zheng; Hui, Hu Guo

doi:10.1109/icebeg.2011.5881816

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Randall and Farris, 2009;Hofmann and Belin, 2011). Other formal modelling approaches include multi-criteria analysis (Liu, 2009), cost-benefit analysis (Yixue, 2010), contracting theory (Li and Xu, 2010), game-theory (Meng and Hui, 2011), and stochastic dynamic modeling (Miao et al, 2011). A comprehensive review and consideration of research on SCF is provided by Hofmann (2013).…”

Section: Market Adoption Of Reverse Factoringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Market adoption of reverse factoring

Iacono

Reindorp

Dellaert

2015

International Journal of Physical Distribution &Amp; Logistics Management

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to show that market dynamics can significantly influence the lifecycle and value of a supply chain finance (SCF) arrangement. Design/methodology/approach – Based on a review of scientific and trade literature, the authors construct a model of market dynamics for reverse factoring, a specific type of SCF arrangement. The authors assume that firms’ participation in a reverse factoring arrangement is determined by the direct benefits they can derive from it. The authors analyse the model by means of simulation in system dynamics. Findings – The authors identify the following market factors as key for direct benefits: competition, interest rates, receivables volumes, and firms’ working capital goals. The authors find that reverse factoring can yield direct benefits for all supply chain participants, but that these benefits are highly sensitive to market conditions. Research limitations/implications – The model is stylized, but this study shows the need for further research on the dynamic aspects of SCF arrangements. Practical implications – The authors show that supply chain actors should carefully consider the expected evolution of market factors when deciding on participation in a reverse factoring arrangement. Originality/value – Existing research on SCF arrangements almost exclusively considers a static context, where market factors take fixed, known values. The authors provide the first study that links the direct benefits of SCF arrangements to dynamic, interacting market factors. The authors utilize system dynamics, a methodology well-suited to the analysis of such settings, to show that a comprehensive assessment of SCF arrangements cannot neglect the evolutionary perspective.

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Section: Market Adoption Of Reverse Factoringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Market adoption of reverse factoring

Iacono

Reindorp

Dellaert

2015

International Journal of Physical Distribution &Amp; Logistics Management

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“…With further development of research on supply chain finance, scholars also studied it more deeply and meticulously. Zheng and Hu [6] elaborated on the benefits of supply chain and formulated an equilibrium pricing mechanism through the model establishment and game analyzing, thus ensuring the maximum benefit of all participants. Bi and Dong [7] built a credit risk assessment system for supply chain finance, which contributes to reducing the risk and enhancing the security of supply chain finance.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply Chain Decision-Making Based on Warehouse Receipt Pledge and Risk Consideration under Twice Ordering Mode

Wang

Shi

2018

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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This paper studies supply chain decisions making between the retailer, supplier, and bank based on warehouse receipt pledge and risk consideration under twice ordering mode. The decentralized supply chain and centralized supply chain are divided by whether the supplier provides repurchase guarantees and whether the retailer offers revenue sharing. We develop a Stackelberg game model to analyze the influential mechanism among various actors and use the method of downside risk control to discuss the bank's expected loss and the optimal loan pledge ratio. We carry out a simulation analysis, and the result is shown as follows: (i) either for decentralized or centralized supply chain, the retailer's optimal order quantity and the optimal proportion that the number of goods pledged by the retailer's twice ordering accounts for the number of first-ordering goods are all unique; (ii) the bank's loan pledge ratio is a monotonically increasing function of disposal value of the unit remaining commodity; (iii) for centralized supply chain, the bank's loan pledge ratio is the monotonically increasing function of repurchase ratio and wholesale price provided by the supplier, respectively; (iv) in the decentralized supply chain, the supplier's return mainly comes from the wholesale revenue and is positively related to the wholesale volume and wholesale price; in the centralized supply chain, the supplier's return is mainly from the retailer's revenue sharing.

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Optimal system design of supply chain finance based on game analysis

Cited by 2 publications

References 8 publications

Market adoption of reverse factoring

Market adoption of reverse factoring

Supply Chain Decision-Making Based on Warehouse Receipt Pledge and Risk Consideration under Twice Ordering Mode

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