2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.002
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Optimal task assignments

Abstract: This paper studies optimal task assignments in a risk neutral principal-agent model in which agents are compensated according to an aggregated performance measure. The main trade-off is one in which specialization allows the implementation of any possible effort profile, while multitasking constraint the set of implementable effort profiles. Yet, the implementation of any effort profile in this set is less expensive than the equivalent profile under specialization. The principal prefers multitasking to special… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Similar models have been considered in the economics literature. For example, Schmitz (2005), Winter (2006), Tamada and Tsai (2007), and Jost and Lammers (2010) consider settings with binary effort; while Lukas (2007), Schmitz (2013), Pi (2014), Balmaceda (2016) and Altan (2019) study settings with binary effort and symmetric costs.…”
Section: Decentralized Setting With a Single Vendormentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Similar models have been considered in the economics literature. For example, Schmitz (2005), Winter (2006), Tamada and Tsai (2007), and Jost and Lammers (2010) consider settings with binary effort; while Lukas (2007), Schmitz (2013), Pi (2014), Balmaceda (2016) and Altan (2019) study settings with binary effort and symmetric costs.…”
Section: Decentralized Setting With a Single Vendormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In contrast, in the current paper, we take the number of agents (i.e., the organizational structure) as given and we consider the optimal choice between the concurrent and sequential development strategies under probabilistic task completion. There are papers in the economics literature that consider probabilistic task completion, some of which focus exclusively on the sequential development strategy (e.g., Green and Taylor 2016, Mason and Välimäki 2015, Pi 2014, Schmitz 2005, Schmitz 2013, Tamada and Tsai 2007, Winter 2006, and Altan 2019), while others focus on the concurrent development strategy (e.g., Bond and Gomes 2009, MacDonald and Marx 2001, and Balmaceda 2016). Finally, other papers from the economics literature (e.g., Chen and Chiu 2013 and Iossa and Martimort 2012) consider tasks that must be completed sequentially, but without probabilistic task completion, where the tasks interact to determine the principal's payoff (e.g., there are externalities such that increased effort on one task may make effort on subsequent tasks more or less effective or efficient).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Felipe Balmaceda [15,16] studied an optimal task assignment method with a loss avoidance agent. It shows that loss avoidance combines the marginal cost of work in one task with the increase in the workload selected in other tasks in order to determine when multitasking saves compensation costs.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%