Optimal taxation and finite horizon

Mathieu-Bolh, Nathalie

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2005.08.032

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…1. Mathieu-Bolh (2006) determines the mathematical conditions for non-zero optimal capital income taxation and time consistency in a simple finite horizon framework. 2.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Optimal taxation and dynamic inefficiency are discussed by Ambler (1999) in an overlapping generations framework and by Aiyagari (1995) and Chamley (2001) in the context of adverse income shocks and incomplete insurance markets. The second motive is consumption reallocation over different generations or ages (Erosa and Gervais 2002;Garriga 2003;Mathieu-Bolh 2006). 1 The seminal contribution by Erosa and Gervais (2002) shows that in a simple life cycle model, it is generally optimal to use age-dependent capital income taxation in the steady state.…”

Section: Abstract Optimal Taxation Life Cycle Income Mobility Borrmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimal Taxation and Income Mobility with Borrowing Limits

Mathieu-Bolh

2011

Public Finance Review

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The author studies age-dependent optimal taxation in an environment that takes into consideration changes in consumption behavior over the life cycle due to changes in labor income paths and borrowing limits. Income mobility is defined as an exogenous rate at which individuals change from a low-to a high-income path. In this framework, the role of age-dependent income taxation is reinforced. Consumption and leisure optimal allocations are not constant over the life cycle even when preferences are additively separable. As a result, age-dependent optimal capital income taxation faced by high-income earners differs from zero for all forms of preferences. In addition, past environments used to study optimal taxation appear as special cases of the proposed model. When the rate of income mobility is infinite, the proposed model nests the simple finite horizon framework. When life expectancy is infinite, the model nests the infinite horizon framework.

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“…1. Mathieu-Bolh (2006) determines the mathematical conditions for non-zero optimal capital income taxation and time consistency in a simple finite horizon framework. 2.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Abstract Optimal Taxation Life Cycle Income Mobility Borrmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Taxation and Income Mobility with Borrowing Limits

Mathieu-Bolh

2011

Public Finance Review

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“…This has been shown by many contributions and is well-known. See, for example, Kemp et al (1993), Aiyagari (1995), Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996), Lansing (1999) Grüner and Heer (2000), Chamley (2001), Erosa and Gervais (2002), Domeij and Heathcote (2004), Abel (2005), Mathieu-Bolh (2006), Werning (2007), Spataro and de Bonis (2008), Conesa et al (2009), Zhang et al (2008), Selim (2010), Saez (2013), Reinhorn (2018), Straub and Werning (2020) and others. 3 Most governments redistribute resources but also grant depreciation allowances to be deducted from collectable tax…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Capital depreciation allowances, redistributive taxation, and economic growth

Rehme

2022

J Public Economic Theory

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Are capital depreciation allowances when coupled with capital income taxes good instruments for redistribution in the long run? In a simple twoagent-economy I find that accelerated depreciation is good for growth, but bad for redistribution. The opposite holds for capital income taxes. However, in a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, where the government is the leader and the private sector the follower, the depreciation allowance is maximal in the long run, time-consistent optimum. This removes the accumulation distortion of capital income taxes. Furthermore, the latter, and so redistribution, is found to be generically nonzero in the time-consistent optimum, and depends on the social weight of transfers receivers, the pretax factor income distribution, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the time preference rate. Thus, accelerated depreciation allowances are an important indirect tool for redistribution. The tax scheme allows for a separation of "efficiency" and "equity" concerns for redistributive policies.

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“…Erosa et al (2002),Mathieu-Bolh (2006), andSpataro et al (2008) show that optimal steady state capital income tax rates are generally nonzero in overlapping generations economies. This result is derived, however, for frameworks with elastic labor supply.…”

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confidence: 99%

Conspicuous Consumption and Overlapping Generations

Wendner

2009

SSRN Journal

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Optimal taxation and finite horizon

Cited by 7 publications

References 12 publications

Optimal Taxation and Income Mobility with Borrowing Limits

Optimal Taxation and Income Mobility with Borrowing Limits

Capital depreciation allowances, redistributive taxation, and economic growth

Conspicuous Consumption and Overlapping Generations

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