Optimal zoning of managerial duopoly

Abstract

This paper investigates optimal zoning of two managerial firms in an unconstrained linear city. Comparing with the case in which firms are not managerial type, the strategic delegation increases the incentives of one firm to locate farther from the rival.Then, a welfare function is introduced to highlight zoning regulation as an influential competition policy tool. Depending on the regulator's objective function and the timing of location choice, we provide a new mechanism that allows the regulator to attain the optimal locations of managerial firms and can lead to strong or weak competition.

The effects of government subsidy on manufacturers' technology sharing behavior with risk consideration

“…For consumers, Products 1 and 2 are substitutable. Following the literature (Cao & Wang, 2023; Chen & Grewal, 2013), we adopt the Hotelling model to capture the consumers' different preferences for the products in the inter‐manufacturer competition. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the Hotelling line, which ranges from 0 to 1; assume that Products 1 and 2 are located at positions 0 and 1, respectively.…”