Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes

Hurwicz, Leonid

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511752940.014

Cited by 224 publications

(170 citation statements)

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“…Also, because t N ∈ F implies i∈N t i = 0 and t i ∈ τ (p; θ i ) for all i ∈ N , it follows that µ W (θ N ) is the set of all Walrasian equilibria. Following Hurwicz's (1960Hurwicz's ( , 1972 original ideas, Mount and Reiter (1974) and Hurwicz (1977) pioneered the formal study of such allocation mechanisms.…”

Section: Minimal Message Spacesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social Choice Procedures

Hammond

2011

Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare

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Section: Minimal Message Spacesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social Choice Procedures

Hammond

2011

Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare

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“…Moreover, it is a price-quantity type, and so it is self-relevant (Hurwicz (1960)). In addition, it is feasible.…”

Section: Independence Of Unused Skills (Ius)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills

Yamada

Yoshihara

2007

Int J Game Theory

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In production economies with unequal labor skills, we study axiomatic characterizations of Pareto subsolutions which are implementable by sharing mechanisms in Nash, strong Nash, and subgame perfect equilibria. The sharing mechanism allows agents to work freely and distributes the produced output to the agents, according to the profile of labor hours and the information on demands, prices, and labor skills. Based on the characterizations, we find that most fair allocation rules, which embody the ethical principles of responsibility and compensation, cannot be implemented when individuals' labor skills are private information.

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“…The question is answered within the theoretical framework of decentralized resource allocation mechanisms (or processes), following the pioneering work of Hurwicz (1960), and Mount and Reiter (1974).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can we identify Walrasian allocations?

Manresa¹

2002

Review of Economic Design

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Abstract. We consider a discrete time, pure exchange infinite horizon economy with n ≥ 2 consumers and ≥ 1 consumption goods per period. Within the framework of decentralized mechanisms, we show that for any given consumption trade at any period of time, say at time one, the consumers will need in general an infinite dimensional (informational) space to identify such a trade as an intertemporal Walrasian one. However, we show a set of environments where the Walrasian trades at each period of time can be achieved as the equilibrium trades of a sequence of decentralized competitive mechanisms, using only both current prices and quantities to coordinate decisions. JEL classification: D51, D91

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Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes

Cited by 224 publications

References 0 publications

Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social Choice Procedures

Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social Choice Procedures

Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills

Can we identify Walrasian allocations?

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