2010
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1533446
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Optimization and its Discontents in Regulatory Design: Bank Regulation as an Example

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Cited by 7 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…VaR risk management models operated through daily price sensitive risk limits that required banks to reduce exposure when the probability of losses increased as a result of falling prices. The efficient markets position, thus, placed so much confidence in market processes and prices that it put those prices at the very centre of regulatory practice, reflecting a basic norm of optimization (Eatwell ; Simon ).…”
Section: Macroprudential As Radical (Transformative?) Third Order Chamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…VaR risk management models operated through daily price sensitive risk limits that required banks to reduce exposure when the probability of losses increased as a result of falling prices. The efficient markets position, thus, placed so much confidence in market processes and prices that it put those prices at the very centre of regulatory practice, reflecting a basic norm of optimization (Eatwell ; Simon ).…”
Section: Macroprudential As Radical (Transformative?) Third Order Chamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In discussing the limitations of the economic, "optimization" perspective with regard to financial regulation, Simon (2010) argues that "[a]n economy in a state of financial collapse may satisfy the sparer definitions of optimality that require only that assets be allocated to those who value (pay for) them most" (10). That is to say, a market may be efficient but still spell social ruin.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…9 Not included in this total is one of the five pieces selected for the 2013 special issue on regulation after the crisis, namely Henriksen (2013), which examines the relationships between policy models, paradigm shifts and the constitution of agency; what is included in this total is one of the 'regular articles' in this same issue (Helleiner and Thistlethwaite 2013). Also not included in the total is a piece which examines two paradigmatic views of regulation and the contrasting ways in which these might inform an analysis of the reform of bank regulation (Simon 2010). 10 All of these appeared in the special issue, Regulating Finance after the Crisis: Unveiling the Different Dynamics of the Regulatory Process (Moschella and Tsingou 2013).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%