Optimized Profit Allocation Model for Service Alliance Transactions Considering Risk

Abstract

In service alliances, where multiple service providers collaborate to complete service transactions, the equitable allocation of profits based on their respective contributions and risk-bearing capacities is paramount. This paper introduces an optimized profit allocation game model that integrates risk considerations into the Nash bargaining framework. Initially, the study established a service alliance transaction model that considered the interactions among multiple participants, providing a robust theoretical foundation for cooperation. Subsequently, the concept of marginal risk was introduced, and a unique calculation method based on the Shapley value was devised to quantify risk contributions. Finally, an improved Nash bargaining model was proposed, which introduced a risk adjustment factor, explicitly addressing the impact of each participant’s risk on profit allocation. Through computational cases and result analyses, this model demonstrated its ability to balance profit and risk and to optimize outcomes for all participants, and it validated the fairness and rationality of the proposed allocation method.