Order-k rationality

Barberà, Salvador; Clippel, Geoffroy de; Neme, Alejandro; Rozen, Kareen

doi:10.1007/s00199-021-01350-z

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 24 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…We exclude models incorporating risk-and ambiguity-preferences (Goeree et al 2003;Eichberger and Kelsey 2011;Beggs 2021). For the same reason, we exclude set-valued solution concepts as well (Goeree et al 2005; Goeree and Louis 2021; Barberà et al 2022). We also exclude models intended to describe learning in games or long-run behavior after learning has occurred, such as experience-weighted attraction (Camerer and Hua Ho 1999), instance-based learning (Gonzalez et al 2003), action-sampling equilibrium (Selten and Chmura 2008), payoff-sampling equilibrium (Osborne and Rubinstein 1998), and impulse-balance equilibrium (Selten and Chmura 2008).…”

Section: Omitted Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The collective wisdom of behavioral game theory

Huang,

Golman

2024

Econ Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We apply an algorithm from the wisdom-of-crowds literature to optimally combine behavioral game theory models to more accurately predict strategic choice in one-shot, simultaneous-move games. We find that the optimal weighted average of seven behavioral game theory models predicts out-of-sample choice behavior significantly better than any of the individual models. The crowd of behavioral game theory models is wiser than any single one of them. Different strategic choice models complement each other by capturing distinct patterns of behavior. The field of behavioral game theory is enriched by having this diversity of models.

show abstract

Section: Omitted Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The collective wisdom of behavioral game theory

Huang,

Golman

2024

Econ Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Further we provide application to the theories which can be associated with limited attention. In particular, we consider theories of sequential choice as in Manzini et al (2013) and good enough choice as in Barberà et al (2019). Sequential procedures involve two preference relations-the first preference relation generates a consideration set, and the second generates a choice out of the consideration set formed at the first stage.…”

Section: Corollary 3 a Data Set Is Completely Rationalizable With Quasilinear Preferences If And Only If It Satisfies Harpmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Algebraic Approach to Revealed Preference

Freer

Martinelli

2020

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We propose and develop an algebraic approach to revealed preference. Our approach dispenses with non algebraic structure, such as topological assumptions. We provide algebraic axioms of revealed preference that subsume previous, classical revealed preference axioms, as well as generate new axioms for behavioral theories, and show that a data set is rationalizable if and only if it is consistent with an algebraic axiom.

show abstract

Behavioral strong implementation

et al. 2023

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Choice behavior is rational if it is based on the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This study re-examines the questions of implementation theory in a setting where players' choice behavior need not be rational and coalition formation must be taken into account. Our model implies that with boundedly rational players, the formation of groups greatly affects the design exercise. As a by-product, we also propose a notion of behavioral efficiency and we compare it with existing notions.

show abstract

Order-k rationality

Cited by 4 publications

References 24 publications

The collective wisdom of behavioral game theory

The collective wisdom of behavioral game theory

An Algebraic Approach to Revealed Preference

Behavioral strong implementation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About