Organizational or Frictional Equilibria, X-Efficiency, and the Rate of Innovation

Leibenstein, Harvey

doi:10.2307/1885452

Cited by 151 publications

(82 citation statements)

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“…Section 4.4 returns to theory, discussing emerging and potential models of pathdependence in building and changing relationships. Leibenstein (1969Leibenstein ( , 1987 was the first we know to outline our argument, using the language of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma to suggest that under-performing enterprises (those inside the production possibility frontier, or "X-inefficient") might be stuck in Defect-Defect equilibria, whereas superior performers might have learned to play Cooperate-Cooperate. But while Leibenstein's argument made appealing use of the multiple equilibria familiar from repeated-game models, neither he nor subsequent models like those in Sections 2.3 and 3.3 spoke directly to "stuck in" or "learned to."…”

Section: Path-dependence 10mentioning

confidence: 99%

Inside Organizations: Pricing, Politics, and Path Dependence

Gibbons

2010

Annu. Rev. Econ.

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When economists have considered organizations, much attention has focused on the boundary of the firm, rather than its internal structures and processes. In contrast, this essay sketches three approaches to the economic theory of internal organizationone substantially developed, another rapidly emerging, and a third on the horizon. The first approach (pricing) applies Pigou's prescription: if markets get prices wrong then the economist's job is to fix the prices. The second approach (politics) considers environments where important actions inside organizations simply cannot be priced, so power and control become central. Finally, the third approach (path-dependence) complements the first two by shifting attention from the "between" variance to the "within." That is, rather than ask how organizations confronting different circumstances should choose different structures and processes, the focus here is on how path-dependence can cause persistent performance differences among seemingly similar enterprises.

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Section: Path-dependence 10mentioning

confidence: 99%

Inside Organizations: Pricing, Politics, and Path Dependence

Gibbons

2010

Annu. Rev. Econ.

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“…Tang e Peng (2003) aduzem que os benefícios de folga são superiores aos seus custos. No entanto, Leibenstein (1969) adverte que a folga gera indisciplina nos investimentos, raramente benefícios econômicos.…”

Section: Folga De Recursos Humanos E Financeiros No Departamento De Cunclassified

“…Há autores, como Indjejikian e Matejka (2006), que são favoráveis à existência de folga de recursos, por esta possibilitar a adaptação da empresa às mudanças do ambiente. Outros, como Leibenstein (1969), a consideram como um custo adicional para as empresas. E ainda há aqueles, como Nohria e Gulati (1997), que acreditam que um nível intermediário é o ideal.…”

Section: Folga Organizacional De Controllers Em Empresas Com Remuneraunclassified

Folga Organizacional De Controllers Em Empresas Com Remuneracão Variável

Beuren

Santos²,

Hein

2015

Organ. Soc.

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medir a folga organizacional dos controllers quanto aos recursos humanos, recursos financeiros e metas orçamentárias, bem como seu nível de participação na elaboração do orçamento e autonomia de decisões. O instrumento de pesquisa foi enviado a controllers de 108 empresas das regiões Sul e Sudeste do Brasil e houve retorno de 24 questionários respondidos. Os resultados mostram que o departamento de controladoria das empresas apresenta, na maioria, folga de recursos humanos; na metade, pouca ou nenhuma e, na outra metade, elevada ou intermediária folga de recursos financeiros; e, na maioria, intermediária folga no alcance das metas orçamentárias. Os controllers destas empresas possuem um nível considerável de participação na elaboração do orçamento e intermediário de autonomia de decisões na organização. Concluiu-se que os controllers apresentam um nível intermediário de folga organizacional e que esta possui relação com a participação dos mesmos no processo orçamentário e seu grau de autonomia nas decisões. Palavras AbstractT he goal of this study is to verify the organizational slack level of controllers in companies with variable compensation. A descriptive research was conducted through a survey, based on

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“…Building on a combination of theoretical arguments and inductive research interviews, we make a conceptual split between structural complexity, which is the elements of the organization, such as the number of reporting lines or integrating mechanisms, that are deliberately put in place to help the organization deliver on its objectives (Galbraith, 1995;Tushman and Nadler, 1978), and experienced complexity, which is the elements of the organization, such as unclear accountabilities or inefficient processes, that have emerged without the approval or involvement of those at the top of the organization (Leibenstein, 1969) and impinge on the ability of individuals to get their work done effectively.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural Versus Experienced Complexity: A New Perspective on the Relationship between Organizational Complexity and Innovation

Cara¹,

Birkinshaw²,

Heywood³

2017

Advances in Strategic Management

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Structural versus experienced complexity : a new perspective on the relationship between organizational complexity and innovation. AbstractIn this paper, we explore the relationship between organizational complexity and firm-level innovation. We define and operationalize a new construct, experienced complexity, which is the extent to which the organizational environment makes it challenging for decision-makers to do their jobs effectively. We distinguish experienced complexity from structural complexity, which is the elements of the organization, such as the number of reporting lines or integrating mechanisms, that are deliberately put in place to help the organization deliver on its objectives, and we argue that structural complexity correlates positively with firm-level innovation while experienced complexity correlates negatively with innovation. Using a novel dataset combining survey and objective data on 209 large firms, we find support for our arguments.2

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Organizational or Frictional Equilibria, X-Efficiency, and the Rate of Innovation

Cited by 151 publications

References 1 publication

Inside Organizations: Pricing, Politics, and Path Dependence

Inside Organizations: Pricing, Politics, and Path Dependence

Folga Organizacional De Controllers Em Empresas Com Remuneracão Variável

Structural Versus Experienced Complexity: A New Perspective on the Relationship between Organizational Complexity and Innovation

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