Organizing cyber capability across military and intelligence entities: collaboration, separation, or centralization

Liebetrau, Tobias

doi:10.1080/25741292.2022.2127551

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Any assessment of Norway's offensive cyber potential is blurred by the uncertainties discussed above. Very little is publicly known about Norway's offensive cyber capabilities and structures (Wilhelmsen et al, 2021;Liebetrau, 2022). The Norwegian Ministry of Defense (2019, p. 19) acknowledges that the responsibility for network-based intelligence operations and offensive cyber operations lies with the Norwegian Intelligence Service.…”

Section: Capabilities: the Case Of Norwaymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The Norwegian Ministry of Defense (2019, p. 19) acknowledges that the responsibility for network-based intelligence operations and offensive cyber operations lies with the Norwegian Intelligence Service. Evidently, Norway has organized the offensive cyber capability in a way that integrates intelligence and military operations in one centralized structure, rather than establishing a stand-alone cyber command (Liebetrau, 2022). However, specifics remain classified.…”

Section: Capabilities: the Case Of Norwaymentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Small State’s Cyber Posture: Deterrence by Punishment and Beyond

Pedersen

2023

SJMS

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This study explores a small-state’s offensive cyber capabilities as a deterrent against great-power cyber hostilities. More specifically, it poses the question: Could Norway successfully deter hostile cyber operations of greater powers, notably China and Russia, by signaling a resolve to retaliate within the same domain? The study reviews literature on the small state’s prospects of acquiring relevant offensive cyber capabilities; successfully signaling a deterrence-by-punishment posture; and, more generally, on the intricacies of retaliating against a greater power. The study concludes that most small states would enter the cyber battlefield with non-strategic and surreptitious capabilities, be inclined to signal their resolve with considerable ambiguity, and be compelled to respond with deniable means. It finds that such obscure features – the hallmarks of murky clandestine operations rather than a strategic posture – do not provide efficacious deterrence. Hence, to Norway and similar small states, deterrence by punishment may be an elusive, if not altogether vain, cyber posture.

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Section: Capabilities: the Case Of Norwaymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Capabilities: the Case Of Norwaymentioning

confidence: 99%