Orientation of the opposition axis in mentally simulated grasping

Frak, Victor; Paulignan, Yves; Jeannerod, Marc

doi:10.1007/s002210000583

Cited by 98 publications

(84 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…to determine the feasibility of grasping an object placed at different orientations: the time it takes to give the response is a function of the object's orientation, suggesting that the arm has to be mentally moved to an appropriate position before the response can be given. Indeed, the time to make this estimate is closely similar to the time it takes to actually reach and grasp an object placed at the same orientation (Frak et al, 2001; see also Parsons, 1994).…”

Section: Imagining and Observing Actions: Simulation And The Limits Omentioning

confidence: 81%

Agency, Simulation and Self‐identification

2004

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This paper is concerned with the problem of self-identification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in self-identification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated by the neural network, and that this simulation provides the basis for action recognition and attribution.In this paper we will be concerned with the problem of self-identification as it arises in the domain of action, which we will take to include both overt and covert or simulated actions.Talk of a problem of identification presupposes a contrast set, and the possibility that, in seeking to identify one self, one picks out something in the contrast set instead. With self-identification, two contrast sets must be considered: the world at large and the set of other selves. The problem of self-identification therefore divides into two sub-problems: self-world discrimination and self-other discrimination. We focus here on the latter problem. Our first aim is to show that there is a problem of self-other discrimination. Our second aim is to discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in self-identification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases.In the first section, we will examine some of the reasons why philosophers have paid little attention to the problem of self-other discrimination, and investigate the conditions under which this problem can arise. In section 2, we will concentrate on the identification of the self as a physical body. In section 3, we will present evidence that we are able to perceive the intentions of others. This will involve the idea of shared representations of actions, the nature and format of which we willWe would like to thank Tim Bayne, Jérôme Dokic, Pierre Jacob, Joëlle Proust, Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, and the participants at the Workshop on Simulation held in Paris in May 2003 for discussions and comments on earlier versions of this paper. We are especially indebted to Gregory Currie for his penetrating and helpful comments and suggestions on multiple drafts of this paper.

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Section: Imagining and Observing Actions: Simulation And The Limits Omentioning

confidence: 81%

Agency, Simulation and Self‐identification

2004

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“…to determine the feasibility of grasping an object placed at different orientations: the time to give the response is a function of the object's orientation, suggesting that the arm has to be mentally moved to an appropriate position before the response can be given. Indeed, the time to make this estimate is closely similar to the time it takes to actually reach and grasp an object placed at the same orientation ( [39] see also [40]). …”

Section: The Simulation Theory: From Motor Imagery To Action Attributionmentioning

confidence: 81%

The mechanism of self-recognition in humans

Jeannerod

2003

Behavioural Brain Research

427

256

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Recognizing oneself as the owner of a body and the agent of actions requires specific mechanisms which have been elucidated only recently. One of these mechanisms is the monitoring of signals arising from bodily movements, i.e. the central signals which contribute to the generation of the movements and the sensory signals which arise from their execution. The congruence between these two sets of signals is a strong index for determining the experiences of ownership and agency, which are the main constituents of the experience of being an independent self. This mechanism, however, does not account from the frequent cases where an intention is generated but the corresponding action is not executed. In this paper, it is postulated that such covert actions are internally simulated by activating specific cortical networks or representations of the intended actions. This process of action simulation is also extended to the observation and the recognition of actions performed or intended by other agents. The problem of disentangling representations that pertain to self-intended actions from those that pertain to actions executed or intended by others, is a critical one for attributing actions to their respective agents. Failure to recognize one's own actions and misattribution of actions may result from pathological conditions which alter the readability of these representations.

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“…Subjects had to judge whether it would be preferable to grasp the handle using an underhand or overhand power grip. This paradigm is similar to the one designed by Frak et al (2001), in which subjects had to judge the complexity of a grasping movement. In both cases, it is possible to use mental chronometry to quantify the imagery performance of the subject.…”

Section: Motor Imagery Paradigmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Motor imagery: A window into the mechanisms and alterations of the motor system

Lange

Roelofs

Toni

2008

Cortex

173

107

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Explicit motor imagery Conversion paralysis fMRI Mental rotation a b s t r a c tMotor imagery is a widely used paradigm for the study of cognitive aspects of action control, both in the healthy and the pathological brain. In this paper we review how motor imagery research has advanced our knowledge of behavioral and neural aspects of action control, both in healthy subjects and clinical populations. Furthermore, we will illustrate how motor imagery can provide new insights in a poorly understood psychopathological condition: conversion paralysis (CP). We measured behavioral and cerebral responses with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in seven CP patients with a lateralized paresis of the arm as they imagined moving the affected or the unaffected hand. Imagined actions were either implicitly induced by the task requirements, or explicitly instructed through verbal instructions. We previously showed that implicitly induced motor imagery of the affected limb leads to larger ventromedial prefrontal responses compared to motor imagery of the unaffected limb. We interpreted this effect in terms of greater self-monitoring of actions during motor imagery of the affected limb. Here, we report new data in support of this interpretation: inducing self-monitoring of actions of both the affected and the unaffected limb (by means of explicitly cued motor imagery) abolishes the activation difference between the affected and the unaffected hand in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Our results show that although implicit and explicit motor imagery both entail motor simulations, they differ in terms of the amount of action monitoring they induce. The IntroductionMotor imagery is a familiar aspect of most people's everyday experience. It is important for learning complex motor skills like sports (Murphy, 1994), as well as re-learning motor skills in neurological populations (Dijkerman et al., 2004;. The potential of motor imagery in clinical applications is broad, ranging from Brain-Computer interfacing (Pfurtscheller and Neuper, 2006)

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Orientation of the opposition axis in mentally simulated grasping

Cited by 98 publications

References 20 publications

Agency, Simulation and Self‐identification

Agency, Simulation and Self‐identification

The mechanism of self-recognition in humans

Motor imagery: A window into the mechanisms and alterations of the motor system

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