Origins of the cognitive (r)evolution

Abstract

The well documented cognitive 'revolution' was to a large extent an evolving return to attitudes and trends that were present prior to the advent of behaviorism and that were alive and well outside of the United States, where behaviorism had not developed any coherent support.The behaviorism of the 1920 to 1950 period was replaced because it was unable to address central issues in human psychology, a failure that was inherent in part in J. B. Watson's founding manifesto with its insistence on the seamless continuity of human and nonhuman animal behavior. The 'revolution' was often slow and piece meal, as illustrated by four conferences held between 1955 and 1966 in the field of memory. With the realization that different approaches and concepts were needed to address a psychology of the human, developments in German, British and Francophone psychology provided some of the fuel of the 'revolution'.The facts of the cognitive revolution in psychology in mid 20th century have been well documented (see, for example, Baars, 1986;Greenwood, 1999, and on more special issues see Murray, 1995; Newell & Simon, 1972). What follows is intended as a further elaboration of those previous presentations. The adoption of, or return to, cognitive themes occured in other disciplines as well, for example in linguistics, but those developments are outside the scope of this presentation. Nor do I wish to treat in detail all areas of experimental psychology; I will concentrate on approaches to human memory. I wish to add the following four arguments to our general understanding of the events surrounding the cognitive resurgence: (1) Part of Watson's program prevented the success of behaviorism and contributed to its replacement. (2) The term 'revolution' is probably inappropriate --there were no cataclysmic events, the change occurred slowly in different subfields over some 10 to 15 years, there was no identifiable flashpoint or leader, and there were no Jacobins. (3) The behaviorist dogmas against which the revolution occurred were essentially confined to the United States. At the same time that behaviorism reigned in the U.S. structuralist, cognitive, and functionalist psychologies were dominant in Germany, Britain, France and even Canada. (4) Stimulus-response behaviorism was not violently displaced, rather as a cognitive approach evolved behaviorism faded because of its failure to solve basic questions about human thought and action, and memory in particular. The birth and failure of American behaviorismThe early 20th century in the United States was marked by a turning inward, a new American consciousness. 1 In science and philosophy the new 20th century was marked by a pragmatic, anti-theoretical preoccupation with making things work --a trend that was to find its expression in psychology in J. B. Watson's behaviorism. I add a remark of Alexis de Tocqueville's which is apposite of the behaviorist development and relates its origin to a more lasting tradition of American democracy: ' ... democratic people are always afraid...

The application of layer theory to design: the control layer

“…Externalized control operations and responding in small increments became much less important. Mandler (2002) describes the ''cognitive revolution'' that took place over a period of roughly 10-15 years, from about 1955 to about 1965. Instructional designers who lived through this revolution saw behaviorist terms such as ''stimulus'', ''elicit'', ''feedback'', ''responding'', and ''reinforcement'' largely disappear from psychological literature.…”

Uma análise das duas revoluções cognitivas

“…Nessa perspectiva, é possível entender que a citada revolução não apenas rompeu com os pressupostos vigentes no que se refere à consolidação de uma ciência psicológica, como também se tornou um marco a partir do qual uma série de novos procedimentos experimentais mostraram-se possíveis em diferentes contextos e em diferentes países (Mandler, 2002). Dito de outra forma, ainda que esse processo possa ser denominado como uma contrarevolução, tal como afirma Miller (2003), é possível concebê-lo como tendo sido desencadeante de uma incomparável proliferação de novos procedimentos investigativos sobre uma série de aspectos constitutivos do psiquismo.…”

“…2007 Uma significativa convergência de trabalhos teóricos e experimentais, bem como a consolidação de uma nova maneira de conceber a mente estiveram no cerne da assim denominada revolução cognitiva ocorrida no final da década de cinqüenta e no início dos anos sessenta (Button, Coutler, Lee, & Sharrock, 1998). Diferentes áreas do conhecimento, tais como Filosofia, Antropologia, Lingüística, Psicologia e Neurociência acabaram por servir-se de uma nova e promissora metáfora para estudar o psiquismo humano (Mandler, 2002). A "metáfora computacional" mostrou-se capaz de ir ao encontro dos novos estudos que, por sua vez, encarregaram-se de evidenciar a possibilidade de investigações científicas sobre os fenômenos mentais, gerando, dentro de um caráter interdisciplinar, as ciências cognitivas.…”

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“…is that thought models, or parallels, reality-that its essential feature is not 2 The history of the information technology revolution has now been told in several ways, each with different emphasis and focus (Conway & Siegelman, 2005;Dyson, 2012;Gardner, 1985;Mandler, 2007). Personal testimonies from psychologists who experienced the post-war period include Mandler (2002), Miller (2003, and Newell and Simon (1972).…”