Osama or the Georges: Shifting Threats and State Policy towards Civil Society in Uzbekistan

Abstract

In examining the relationship between the War on Terror and restrictions on civil society, Uzbekistan is an important case, given its emergence as a key player in the operations in Afghanistan, its own terrorist threat, and its particularly stringent policy towards civil society. This article argues that while the ‘crackdown’ on civil society has followed a similar pattern to that of other countries where civil society is perceived as harbouring a threat, there has been a significant shift since the War on Terror began as to the perceived nature of the threat. At the time of 9/11, the government of Uzbekistan took Islamic terrorism to be the main threat; yet within the space of just over two years a new threat was perceived. Western support for civil society, a concession made to the US‐led coalition in return for support against Islamic terrorism, emerged as an even greater threat to the regime. It is this perceived threat that has primarily driven state policy towards civil society, raising important questions about how democracy promotion can be best taken forward in the post‐9/11 world.

Politics of Conviviality? State–Civil Society Relations Within the Context of Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria

“…4 Consequently, as a way of encouraging these "good" CSOs, states and foreign donor organisations ensured that they are well off through the provision of funds and unhindered access to resources. In other words, within the context of counter-terrorism, foreign and local aids to CSOs in different political contexts are being deployed strategically (Howell andLind 2009, 2010;Colas 2010;Stevens 2010). Thus, while some CSOs that have been termed "donor darlings" benefit from the largesse of the state as a result of their cooperation, others that are perceived as security threats or uncooperative have 4 These roles include government support through programmes that prevents the recruitment of youths into violent extremism, reintegrating ex-convicts into society, reaching out to moderate Muslim preachers to help deconstruct extremist narratives, reviewing the pedagogy of madrassas, and providing social welfare to victims of terrorists attacks, counter-terrorism operations, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.…”

“…However, the implementation of counter-terrorism policies is not always neat, as security agents tend to widen their nets to other areas that have no terrorist links. This situation affected CSO operations and forced them to become complicit in government policy (Dunn 2010) In Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, no resistance or opposition to state policies by CSOs was observed because of government repression (Stevens andJailobaeva 2010, Rubongoya 2010). While Bloodgood and Tremblay-Biore (2010: 5) attributed the responses of CSOs to "the amount of uncertainty created and, the availability of access to participate in policy making," Howell and Lind (2009) argue that in the global south, where the repression of CSOs in state's counter-terrorism policies have taken root, the silence of mainstream CSOs and the vocal opposition of minority groups is traced to the internal divisions extant among civil society in these countries.…”

State‐oriented service‐delivery partnership with civil society organizations in the context of counter‐terrorism in Nigeria

“…Interestingly, in hybrid and authoritarian regimes, the state has used the narrative of counter‐terrorism to turn CSOs into appendages of the state, effectively making them “governmental non‐governmental organizations” (GONGOs). Stevens (2010) and Noori (2007) argue that in Uzbekistan, state–NGO relations influenced NGOs in ways that led to them becoming GONGOs. Stevens (2010) explicitly states that despite the government’s claims of plurality in dealing with CSOs, many of these organizations had become arms of the state.…”

“…Stevens (2010) and Noori (2007) argue that in Uzbekistan, state-NGO relations influenced NGOs in ways that led to them becoming GONGOs. Stevens (2010) explicitly states that despite the government's claims of plurality in dealing with CSOs, many of these organizations had become arms of the state.…”

Conceptualizing government-organized non-governmental organizations

“…As such, we favor a functional dimension to construct a definition of a GONGO on the basis of its functions. GONGOs are usually founded and initially organized by the government to provide a service to society, one that the government is unable or unwilling to do (Stevens, 2010;Wells-Dang, 2012;Deng et al, 2016). It is important to remember that these organizations might be preferred over 'fully autonomous' NGOs as they are more easily integrated into a government's corporatist structure, less likely to serve as a threat to government's power, less prone to hurt their reputation, and more able to promote a certain agenda-as in the case of Mulligan's (2007) study of Azam in Sarawak, Malaysia or Wu (2003) and Hsu et al's (2017) studies looking at China.…”