Oslo and Its Aftermath: Lessons Learned from Track Two Diplomacy

Abstract

Since the collapse of the Oslo peace process and the violence that followed, many scholars have reflected upon the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. Most of this analysis has focused on official negotiations without considering the substantial role that unofficial peace efforts have played in peacebuilding, both prior to and after Oslo. This article, in contrast, seeks to better understand the application of “track two” diplomacy to the Israeli–Palestinian case. It reports on a self‐reflection effort by numerous Israeli–Palestinian peace practitioners to better understand what has worked, what has not, and how new initiatives could be more effectively organized and carried out in the future. The research presented is based on an inventory of seventy‐nine track two projects that occurred between Israelis and Palestinians between 1992 and 2004, personal interviews with many of those who organized and oversaw these projects, and two focus group meetings that brought together a total of forty practitioners. In this article, we seek to better understand two issues: (1) how track two initiatives have changed in scope, organization, and intent; and (2) how track two practitioners have sought to disseminate their work beyond the participants of those initiatives. Our findings present an overall picture of the Israeli–Palestinian second track practice and identify a number of trends and common types of practice. Among the trends we have identified are the following: during the peace process years, more track two initiatives were undertaken with elite/professional participants than with representatives of the grassroots, but in the subsequent decade‐and‐a‐half, Israeli–Palestinian grassroots, track two initiatives gradually replaced senior‐level track two exchanges; most of the grassroots initiatives we studied were relationship focused, whereas those involving elite participants are outcome focused; the track two community subscribes to a set of theoretical propositions about which conditions and contexts facilitate the transmission of track two insights and ideas to the political process, but these propositions have yet to be validated; and track two specialists do little strategic planning about ways to most effectively transfer track two insights and ideas to the political process. Our research also identified four distinct, but not mutually exclusive, approaches to practice: the psychological, the constructivist, the capacity building, and the realistic interest.

Do Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and Track Two Processes Support Transboundary Marine Conservation? Lessons From Six Case Studies of Maritime Disputes

“…This means that Track Two should be used to reach a more sustainable, long-lasting, real peace, especially at times when Track One diplomacy only provides a narrow solution to a narrow problem. Track Two tends to treat the underlying problems that caused the conflict to erupt in the first place (Çuhadar and Dayton, 2012). Track Three might emerge when other channels are perceived by certain parties as absent, lacking or inaccessible.…”

Drops of diplomacy: Questioning the scale of hydro-diplomacy through fog-harvesting

“…But this does not necessarily promise any sort of friendliness between the countries, an end to tensions, or resolution of the initiating problems. Track 2 Diplomacy, on the other hand, can be strongly tied to sustainable peace in its work to overcome stereotypes of negative perceptions and rehumanize the 'other'; reframe stories and historical narratives of conflict; empower young people and others through training; and solve shared problems (Çuhadar and Dayton 2012). Derian suggests that diplomacy can be thought of as the mediation of the process of othering; his use of theories of alienation and estrangement -and the growing attention to Tracks 1.5, 2, and 3 -can be seen as making diplomacy scholarship and practice less state-centric and focused on society as a whole (1987).…”

“…Since Montville's original formulation, the "Tracks" of diplomacy have taken off in several sometimes-divergent directions, with various authors naming and describing Tracks 1, 1.5, and 2 (see, e.g.,Böhmelt 2010;Çuhadar 2009;Çuhadar and Dayton 2012;and Mapendere 2000). Categories are generally based on the type of actors intervening, as well as the kind of intervention, distinguishing between "work which seeks to bring together the leaders within a conflict situation and those reaching out to the wider population"(Popiolkowski and Cull 2009, 3).Relatively few comparative studies of non-state diplomacy exist, with the majority of research exploring single events(Çuhadar and Dayton 2012), but the extant studies do indicate that Track 2 diplomatic efforts are most useful when used as a pre-negotiation strategy (ibid, 158; see alsoFisher 2006;Nan 1999). Çuhadar asks whether diplomatic efforts can be 'transferred' between tracks.…”

Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Beyond the Inclusion–Exclusion Dichotomy

“…A number of studies explicitly assess the impact of conflict resolution workshops on Track One peace negotiations. This debate is examined in the conflict resolution literature under the terms “transfer” (Fisher ), “dissemination” (Cuhadar and Dayton ), or “coordination” (Nan and Strimling ). Ronald Fisher () wrote that these workshops helped prepare the ground for negotiations and develop new ideas.…”

“…Maria Jessop, Diana Aljets, and Betsie Chacko () concluded that civil society organizations can have greatest impact on peace negotiations if they have already been involved in pre‐negotiations, while Esra Çuhadar () found that these initiatives had a greater impact when they focused on outcomes other than peace such as water management. Most researchers agree that the more closely the workshop participants cooperate with Track One negotiators and mediators, the greater their impact on the negotiations will be (e.g., Kelman ; Fisher ; Lieberfeld ; Çuhadar ; Cuhadar and Dayton ). Contacting official mediators and negotiators and bringing key people from Track Two initiatives to participate in formal negotiations can also be successful transfer mechanisms (Çuhadar ).…”