Other Histories, Other Biologies

Abstract

When philosophers look to the history of biology, they most often ask about what happened, and how best to describe it. They ask, for instance, whether molecular genetics subsumed the Mendelian genetics preceding it, or whether these two sciences have main–tained rather messier relations. Here I wish to pose a question as much about what did not happen as what did. My concern is with the strength of the links between our biological science—our biology—and the particular history which brought that science into being. Would quite different histories have produced roughly the same science? Or, on the contrary, would different histories have produced other, quite different biologies?

Inevitability, contingency, and epistemic humility

“…Such a supposition is, of 8 See Inkpen and Turner (2012). 9 See, e.g., Radick (2005), p. 24 and Hacking (1999), p. 80 and (2000), p. 70. 10 See, e.g., Keller (1985Keller ( , 1995.…”

State of the field: Are the results of science contingent or inevitable?

“…It is often believed that case studies from the history of science warrant specific philosophical views on the contingency issue. Most arguments in favor of contingentist interpretations of science have been put forward on the basis of historical accounts of past scientific developments (Bowler, 2008;Chang, 2012, 14e65;Collins, 1985, 79e111;Cushing, 1994;Pickering, 1984;Radick, 2003Radick, , 2005. And inevitabilists too cite historical material to underpin their views (Weinberg, 1994, 236e37;Weinberg, 2001, 198e199;Franklin, 1990Franklin, , 1994Franklin, , 2008.…”

“…Close attention to the particular, the local and the contingent became a hallmark of good historiographical writing. More recently, ventures in counterfactual history explored possible or plausible alternative scientific trajectories (Bowler, 2008;Chang, 2012, 43e50;Radick, 2005).…”

“…The issue has since been explored in more detail in a symposium organized by Léna Soler, published in History and Philosophy of Science (Franklin, 2008;Sankey, 2008;Soler, 2008aSoler, , 2008bTrizio, 2008), in a focus section of Isis dedicated to the role of counterfactuals in the history of science (Bowler, 2008;French, 2008;Fuller, 2008;Henry, 2008;Radick, 2008) and at a conference titled Science as it Could Have Been, held in 2009. 2 We can find some further explicit references to the contingency issue (Kidd, 2013, in press;Martin, 2013;Radick, 2003Radick, , 2005 but in general, systematic and conceptually rigorous literature on the problem is rare. Hence, we are confronted with a remarkable discrepancy between the large amount of sociological, historical and philosophical literature that raises vital questions concerning contingency in science on the one hand, and the small amount of philosophical work that is explicitly devoted to this issue on the other.…”

Commentary 03 on Lilley 1953 and Truesdell 1973

“…For example, Jim Cushing, following in Forman’s footsteps, has attributed the dominance of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics among physicists to historical contingency (Cushing, 1994). More recently, Gregory Radick has suggested that there was nothing inevitable about the ‘discovery’ of genes and explored alternative paths that biology might have taken (Radick, 2005).…”