Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem

Abstract

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. The Econometric Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Econometrica.A two-person bargaining problem is considered. It is shown that under four axioms that describe the behavior of players there is a unique solution to such a problem. The axioms and the solution presented are different from those suggested by Nash. Also, families of solutions which satisfy a more limited set of axioms and which are continuous are discussed.

Bargaining Over Risky Assets

“…Substituting (4) in (3) optimally Therefore, (8) states that, in CE terms, the consumption that our equilibrium allocates to agent i at date t consists of what he already owns and the sum of gains from (optimal) trade when he makes offers in the future. Equation (8) is similar to (5 KalaiSmorodinsky (1975). Roth (1985) shows that Given any (Pareto-optimal and individually rational 10…”

Agent Reasoning in Negotiation

“…Therefore, some researchers have studied multi-issue negotiations using issue by issue negotiation and analyze when this simplification is applicable (e.g., (Luo et al 2003)). In cooperative game theory, Nash and others ((Nash 1951), (Nash 1953), (Luce and Raiffa 1989), (Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975) and (Ponsati and Watson 1997)) have focused on designing appropriate axioms that characterize the negotiation solution.…”

Efficiency in Family Bargaining: Living Arrangements and Caregiving Decisions of Adult Children and Disabled Elderly Parents

“…Bargaining models of marriage have emphasized Nash bargaining and neglected other cooperative bargaining models and solution concepts. For example, although Manser and Brown considered both the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solutions, subsequent work on bargaining in families has virtually ignored KalaiSmorodinsky. Gugl (2004) provides an interesting exception, considering both the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions.…”