Ought-contextualism and reasoning

Bradley, Darren

doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02918-3

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 98 publications

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“…I think that my formulation in terms of an agent not being rational more explicitly conveys what the problem is here. 10 In a recent paper, Bradley (2021) has proposed several bridge principles from the point of view of his "'ought-contextualism'," according to which a deontic operator can be relativized in various ways depending on the context. Thus, Bradley proposes bridge principles regarding not only first-personal guidance, which is what interests us here, but also third-personal evaluation and appraisal.…”

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confidence: 99%

A new bridge principle for the normativity of logic

Orilia

2022

Theoria

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Logic appears to be normative for rational belief. The thesis of the normativity of logic holds that indeed logic has such a normative status. Gilbert Harman has questioned it, thereby giving rise to what has been called "Harman's skeptical challenge". MacFarlane has clarified that in order to answer this challenge and support the normativity of logic, one needs a "bridge principle" that appropriately connects logical entailments and norms for belief, as well as relevant desiderata for the evaluation of candidate bridge principles. Steinberger has identified a list of desiderata, on the basis of which he has proposed his own bridge principle and shown the inadequacy of previous proposals. This paper argues that Steinberger's list is in need of revision and his principle is unsatisfactory, and then puts forward a revised list of desiderata and a new bridge principle in support of the normativity of logic.

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confidence: 99%

A new bridge principle for the normativity of logic

Orilia

2022

Theoria

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“…As we have discussed, our favoured account of this phenomenon is a contextualist one, on which comparative adjectives typically admit "coarse-grained" readings that set undemanding standards for 'equally 𝐹' and demanding standards for 'more 𝐹 than', as well as "fine-grained" readings that work the other way round. 'Ought' also seems, famously, to be context-sensitive (Kratzer 2012;von Fintel and Iatridou 2008;Wedgwood 2006Wedgwood , 2007Bradley 2021;Finlay 2014;Saint Croix and Thomason 2014;Silk 2014Silk , 2013Cariani 2013;Carr 2015;Bronfman and Dowell 2018;Chrisman 2015;Worsnip 2019). So it is entirely in the spirit of our approach to say that 'ought' also admits corresponding coarse-and fine-grained readings, where the argument for Uniqueness only goes through on the fine-grained readings.…”

Section: 'Ought' and Uniquenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consequences of comparability

Dorr¹,

Nebel²,

Zuehl³

2021

Philosophical Perspectives

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We defend three claims about preference, credence, and choice. First, all agents (not just rational ones) have complete preferences. Second, all agents (again, not just rational ones) have real-valued credences in every proposition in which they are confident to any degree. Third, there is almost always some unique thing we ought to do, want, or believe.These claims may seem absurd. But as we will show, they follow from certain hard-to-resist premises by a principle of the logic of comparatives that we call Comparability. This principle requires, to a first approximation, that if two things are not equally 𝐹, then one must be more 𝐹 than the other. Although many philosophers have rejected Comparability, it is widely assumed in the semantics literature on gradable adjectives and other comparative expressions. In a companion paper (Dorr, Nebel, and Zuehl 2021) we defend its validity. In the present paper, we take Comparability for granted and use it to argue for further controversial conclusions. Of course, those who reject these conclusions may prefer to read the present paper as providing a further battery of modus tollens arguments to back up the putative counterexamples that have already convinced so many philosophers to reject Comparability. But we argue, in each case, that the consequences of Comparability are less implausible than they might initially seem.We provide the necessary background in section 1. The rest of the paper draws out our central claims for preference, credence, and choice. COMPARATIVES AND COMPARABILITYComparative constructions include, paradigmatically, the comparative forms of adjectives ('more 𝐹' or '𝐹-er') and the equative form ('[at least] as 𝐹 as'). We are concerned with the logic of such constructions. Here are some examples of valid schemas involving comparative constructions:Strict Comparison 𝑥 is more 𝐹 than 𝑦 if and only if 𝑥 is at least as 𝐹 as 𝑦 and 𝑦 is not at least as 𝐹 as 𝑥.Equality 𝑥 and 𝑦 are equally 𝐹 if and only if 𝑥 is at least as 𝐹 as 𝑦 and 𝑦 is at least as 𝐹 as 𝑥.

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“… 1 Following MacFarlane (2004), the recent literature on the normativity of logic has focused on a related, but different question of “in what sense is logic normative” and has resulted in a debate on the so-called “bridge principles,” i.e., principles that are supposed to connect logic to norms governing beliefs. Other participants in this debate include Steinberger (2019), Oza (2020), Bradley (2021), Pettigrew (2017), and Field (2009). …”

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confidence: 99%

Reductive Evidentialism and the Normativity of Logic

Shoaibi

2022

Can. J. of Philosophy

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‘Reductive Evidentialism’ seeks to explain away all ‘structural’ requirements of rationality—including norms of logical coherence—in terms of ‘substantive’ norms of rationality, i.e., responsiveness to evidence. While this view constitutes a novel take on the source of the normativity of logic, I argue that it faces serious difficulties. My argument, in a nutshell, is that on the assumption that individuals with the same evidence can have different rational responses (interpersonal permissivism), the view lacks the resources to maintain its central tenet that an individual’s body of evidence cannot make it rationally permissible for the individual to believe logical inconsistencies (intrapersonal nonpermissivism).

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Ought-contextualism and reasoning

Cited by 4 publications

References 98 publications

A new bridge principle for the normativity of logic

A new bridge principle for the normativity of logic

Consequences of comparability

Reductive Evidentialism and the Normativity of Logic

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