Ought implies can and deontic logic

Dahl, Norman O.

doi:10.1007/bf02379302

Cited by 12 publications

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“…The view that obligations to promote global justice, such as helping others in need depends on our abilities is motivated by the longstanding ethical principle that "ought implies can". Support for this principle weaves its way through the history of western philosophy and is accepted by most contemporary anglophone philosophers (Kant 1998;Littlejohn 2012;Moore 1922;Hare 1965;Van Fraassen 1973;Dahl 1974;Vranas 2007;Copp 2008;Cicero and Edmonds 1856). Although the principle is glossed in many forms, the basic idea is that inability rules out obligation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ability, Responsibility, and Global Justice

Buckwalter

2017

J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res.

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Many have argued we have a moral obligation to assist others in need, but given the scope of global suffering, how far does this obligation extend? According to one traditional philosophical view, the obligation to help others is limited by our ability to help them, or by the principle that "ought implies can". This view is primarily defended on the grounds that it is a core principle of commonsense moral psychology. This paper reviews findings from experimental philosophy in cognitive science demonstrating that "ought implies can" is rejected by moral psychology. Researchers find that moral obligations are ascribed to agents who cannot fulfill them, suggesting that moral requirements do sometimes extend beyond what we are able to do. This research furthers our understanding of moral obligation, identifies an important need for further cross-cultural work in moral psychology, and demonstrates a way in which scientific experimentation can be applied to improve upon the conceptual analysis of important philosophical concepts in normative ethics.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ability, Responsibility, and Global Justice

Buckwalter

2017

J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res.

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“…A widely accepted view in western philosophy is that moral obligations entail the ability to fulfill them, often glossed in the slogan that Bought implies can^ (Copp 2008;Dahl 1974;Feldman 1986;Fischer 2003;Hare 1965;Howard-Snyder 2006;Moore 1922;Streumer 2003;Van Fraassen 1973). This longstanding principle can be traced from ancient philosophy (Cicero: Bpromises are not binding when the performance is impossible,^1856) and modern philosophy (Kant: Bduty commands nothing but what we can do,^1793/1998) to contemporary normative ethics (Vranas: Ban agent at a given time has an objective, pro tanto obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do,^2007: 167), and social political philosophy (O'Neill: Binstitutions and individuals can have obligations if but only if they have adequate capabilities to fulfill or discharge those obligations,^2004: 251).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theoretical Motivation of “Ought Implies Can”

Buckwalter

2019

Philosophia

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A standard principle in ethics is that moral obligation entails ability, or that Bought implies can^. A strong case has been made that this principle is not well motivated in moral psychology. This paper presents an analogous case against the theoretical motivation for the principle. The principle is in tension with several foundational areas of ethical theorizing, including research on apologies, excuses, promises, moral dilemmas, moral language, disability, and moral agency. Across each of these areas, accepting the principle that obligation entails ability creates a theoretical problem that is more easily solved by rejecting it rather than accepting it. I conclude that the motivation for the principle is weak and that Bought implies can^should be rejected in ethics on theoretical grounds.

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“…It might of course be that saving the antique is indeed supererogatory. However, in principle, it is possible to advance a new example where the source action is not supererogatory while retaining the same argumentative structure as that in Kolodny's original example.17 For further a discussion concerning 'ought implies can' see(Austin 1956;Carlson 1999;Dahl 1974;Howard-Snyder 1997;King 2014;Stocker 1971;Vranas 2007).18 This might depend on one's view in Jackson-style cases, such as the doctor who can give one of three possible drugs to a sick patient. One of the drugs will partially cure the patient.…”

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confidence: 99%

Normative Transmission and Necessary Means

Werkmäster

2018

Philosophia

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This paper focuses on the interaction of reasons and argues that reasons for an action may transmit to the necessary means of that action. Analyzing exactly how this phenomenon may be captured by principles governing normative transmission has proved an intricate task in recent years. In this paper, I assess three formulations focusing on normative transmission and necessary means: Ought Necessity, Strong Necessity, and Weak Necessity. My focus is on responding to two of the main objections raised against normative transmission for necessary means, in that they seem to give us reasons for buying tickets to plays we have no intention of seeing and that the principles give us the wrong result when the means are necessary but not sufficient. Even though these objections have been discussed previously, the counterarguments have so far relied on rejecting premises that the proponents of these objections are unlikely to concede. In this paper, I show how we may answer the objections in a way more likely to convince proponents of the objections. The result is an argument for a key aspect when it comes to understanding how reasons and ends-means normativity function. Normative transmission from ends to necessary means is not only interesting at the structural level, it is also possible to argue that it has implications for areas as diverse as philosophy of rationality, political philosophy and applied ethics.

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Ought implies can and deontic logic

Cited by 12 publications

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Ability, Responsibility, and Global Justice

Ability, Responsibility, and Global Justice

Theoretical Motivation of “Ought Implies Can”

Normative Transmission and Necessary Means

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