Our Experience of Passage on the B-Theory

Abstract

Elsewhere I have suggested that the B-theory includes a notion of passage, by virtue of including succession. Here, I provide further support for that claim by showing that uncontroversial elements of the B-theory straightforwardly ground a veridical sense of passage. First, I argue that the B-theory predicts that subjects of experience have a sense of passivity with respect to time that they do not have with respect to space, which they are right to have, even according to the B-theory. I then ask what else might be involved in our experience of time as passing that is not yet vindicated by the B-theoretic conception. I examine a recent B-theoretic explanation of our 'illusory' sense of passage, by Robin Le Poidevin, and argue that it explains away too much: our perception of succession poses no more of a problem on the B-theory than it does on other theories of time. Finally, I respond to an objection by Oreste Fiocco that a causal account of our sense of passage cannot succeed, because it leaves out the 'phenomenological novelty' of each moment.

Temporal Experience and the A Versus B Debate

“…The other is that in a causally ordered sequence of pairs of spatial and temporal locations (supposing now that space were one-dimensional too), the temporal coordinate of the elements monotonically increases, but the spatial one need not. This is significant because it helps explain why we feel a certain passivity with respect to time that we don't feel with respect to space (Deng 2013c). Recall the presentness intuition.…”

C‐theories of time: On the adirectionality of time

“…Moreover, 'static' theorists of time ordinarily take the characteristically dynamic aspects of temporal experience to be entailed by their theories-cf. Williams (1951); Prosser (2013Prosser ( , 2016; Deng (2013); Farr (2020b). 2 Though the A-and B-theories are based on McTaggart's A and B series, the contemporary usage and understanding of 'A-theory' and 'B-theory' come from Richard M. Gale.…”

“…Moreover, ‘static’ theorists of time ordinarily take the characteristically dynamic aspects of temporal experience to be entailed by their theories—cf. Williams (1951); Prosser (2013, 2016); Deng (2013); Farr (2020b).…”

Time and the domain of consciousness

“…He also remembers that, at that time, he had future‐tensed beliefs about dinner but no memories about any times later than 3 o'clock. So John at dinner time notices that time has ‘moved on.’ [N]ot only does he feel as if he is constantly ‘moving towards’ the future, but he feels a certain passivity in this respect …”