Out‐of‐District Donors and Representation in the US House

Abstract

Out-of-District Donors and Representation in the US Houseus House members have become increasingly reliant on out-of-district individuals for fundraising. yet we have little evidence on how such donations might affect representatives' policy decisions. given the high partisanship known to dominate House roll calls, do the preferences of individual donors influence policymaking at all? and are members who rely on out-of-district contributions more responsive to the preferences of the national donor base? this article examines these and related questions, producing three main findings. First, even accounting for well-established partisanship in House voting, representatives are responsive to the policy preferences of the national donor base. second, this donor responsiveness is positively associated with electoral safety, including when redistricting exogenously induces the safety. third, the higher a member's reliance on out-of-district donations, the greater is their responsiveness to the preferences of the national donor base. together, these findings suggest that current fundraising dynamics skew representation in significant ways. NOTESWe are grateful for helpful feedback from Nathan gibson, Ben Hammond, Mike Kistner, tony Madonna, Leah rosenstiel, sebastian thieme, and participants in seminars at Nyu, stanford, yale, and the 2019 Midwest Political science association Meetings. also, we are indebted to Mike Crespin and Barry edwards, and to seth Hill and greg Huber, for sharing data from earlier work. Neither author has any financial or other conflict of interest with respect to the article.

Keep Winning with WinRed? Online Fundraising Platform as the Party’s Public Good

“…For example, as a conduit, WinRed's mandatory disclosure of small-donor contributions may enhance candidates' ability to customize their solicitation strategies to these previously "hidden" donors (Alvarez et al, 2020), which may consequently increase reliance on small donors among Republican candidates on the platform. Given divergent donation motivations and candidate preferences among small individual donors, large individual donors, interest groups, and party organizations (Barber et al, 2017;La Raja and Schaffner, 2015), and given candidates' responsiveness to the national donorate (Canes-Wrone and Miller, 2021), WinRed may be able to shape strategic legislative behavior and candidate entry in the Republican Party by reshaping the relative importance of different funding sources.…”

No Experience Required: Early Donations and Amateur Candidate Success in Primary Elections

“…Another explanation may hinge on changes to the composition of these out‐of‐district early donor networks. If out‐of‐district donors have become less like the professional colleagues described by Bonica (2017) and more like the ideological activists described by Canes‐Wrone and Miller (2021), this could account for the observed shift in their importance to amateur candidates' campaigns. This follows work by Rauch and La Raja (2017), who show that out‐of‐district donors and other ideological interests have the tools, resources, and grassroots networks needed to get amateur candidates campaigns off the ground.…”

“…Campaign contributions from individuals outside of a candidate's own congressional district have skyrocketed over the last decade. Employing congressional staff interviews, Canes‐Wrone and Miller (2021) show that these out‐of‐district contributors are, “more ideological and attentive to politics” (p. 9), unlike within‐district donors who tend to support candidates for personal reasons. Much like ideological PACs, out‐of‐district donors tend to have “purposive” motivations; they donate because they regard a candidate as a strong advocate for shared policy priorities or view her as possessing ideological predilections similar to their own (Barber 2016).…”

Competition in Congressional Elections: Money versus Votes

“…The measures have serious normative implications as well. The emphasis on money has negative consequences for who runs as well as who wins, and it leads to unorthodox conclusions about representation that are not based on levels of constituent support (Canes-Wrone and Miller 2022; Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2008). However, it is important to note that these concerns are rooted in the state of American elections rather than the measure itself.…”