Outside Director Stock Options and Dividend Policy

Boumosleh, Anwar; Cline, Brandon N.

doi:10.1007/s10693-013-0174-2

Cited by 25 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…In column 2 of Table 6, we estimated the relationship between ownership structure and dividend smoothing. In line with the study of Boumosleh and Cline (2015), Table 6 shows that Pakistani banks with high management ownership smooth less because of greater alignment, caused by high management ownership. Banks with low insider ownership have severe agency problems, hence they smooth more.…”

Section: Final Resultssupporting

confidence: 76%

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Corporate Governance and Dividend Smoothing: Evidence from Pakistani Listed Banks

Ali

Hanming

Ullah

2018

AJBA

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Manuscript type: Research paper Research aims: This paper empirically examines the effects of ownership and board structure on dividend smoothing in Pakistani listed banks between 2006 and 2014. Design/Methodology/Approach: This study employs random Tobit regression to analyse the effects of ownership and board structure on dividend smoothing. It also applies principal component analysis (PCA) to develop a corporate governance index. Research findings: The findings indicate that Pakistani banks with concentrated and foreign ownership, small size audit committee and less independent boards, exhibit higher levels of dividend smoothing. Interestingly, the study finds Pakistani banks having a joint position of CEO and chairperson, demonstrate lesser dividend smoothing. The study concludes that increasing dividends is an alternative monitoring mechanism for shareholders who are enclosed within a weak corporate governance environment such as Pakistan. Theoretical contribution/Originality: This study contributes to previous literature on corporate governance and dividend smoothing by investigating the role of the boards and the ownership structure. It also fills the research gap by investigating the impact of corporate governance on dividend smoothing by using the CG-Index.

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Section: Final Resultssupporting

confidence: 76%

“…Similarly, companies with director's stock options do not need an external mechanism for using dividends to reduce the agency conflict. This finding has been consistent for firms with excessive free cash (Boumosleh & Cline, 2015).…”

Section: Hypotheses Developmentsupporting

confidence: 73%

Corporate Governance and Dividend Smoothing: Evidence from Pakistani Listed Banks

Ali

Hanming

Ullah

2018

AJBA

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“…Dividend payout also serves as mechanism of addressing agency related problems as a consequence of separation of ownership and control (Francis et al, 2011;Jiraporn, Kim and Kim, 2011). Agency theory suggested that dividend payment can reduce managers' likelihood of perquisite consumption and empire building due excess cash available in the firm (Jiraporn, Kim and Kim, 2011;Boumosleh and Cline, 2015). Therefore, it is relevant to factor out among others what influences decision to pay or not to pay dividends among firms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Empirically, previous evidence has shown that the size of a firm, its profitability and growth are among the leading factors that determine firms' propensity to pay dividends (Fama and French, 2001;DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, 2004;Fatemi and Bildik, 2012) and firms corporate governance (Francis et al, 2011;Jiraporn, Kim and Kim, 2011;Boumosleh and Cline, 2015). Regarding the board diversity for example, the relationship between female director and dividend policy is still an open question, only a handful studies attempted to examine this relationship using data from the US (Byoun, Chang and Kim, 2016) China (McGuinness, Lam and Vieito, 2015) Spain (Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms, 2016) international study (Saeed and Sameer, 2017) and Nigeria (Idris, Ishak and Hassan, 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dividend payout among Nigerian firms: Do female directors matters?

Idris¹,

Ishak

Hassan

2019

JEM

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This study explores how female director(s) affect the decision to pay dividend in the sub-Saharan Africa. The study specifically employs non-financial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange Market from 2009-2015 and logit regression as the technique for data analysis. The independent variable of interest in the study is female director. Consistent with the hypothesis, the study found strong association that firms with at least one female director on board are more likely to affect the payment of dividends. The findings subsist after the commencement of the 2011 CCG and when firms with negative earnings were excluded from the main sample. Furthermore, the results do not change when the model was re-estimated using an alternative measure of female director as well as using OLS regression.

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“…The literature on outside director incentives mainly focuses on monetary rewards (e.g., Yermack 2004;Adams and Ferreira 2008;Boumosleh and Cline 2015), performance sensitivity of director compensation (e.g., Perry 1999;Yermack 2004) and reputation concerns (e.g., Fich and Shivdasani 2007;Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz 2010). Counting the number of cases that led to outof-pocket liability of outside directors might serve as a good starting point but reveals little about incentives: a low number of cases, as documented by Black and Cheffins (2006), is equally consistent with strong incentive effects (supervisory board members chose high effort levels to avoid liability) and irrelevance (liability risks are practically nonexistent).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Board Accountability and Risk Taking in Banking: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment

Körner

2016

J Financ Serv Res

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily refl ect those of the editors. Terms of use: Documents in Ruhr Economic Papers #313

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Outside Director Stock Options and Dividend Policy

Cited by 25 publications

References 40 publications

Corporate Governance and Dividend Smoothing: Evidence from Pakistani Listed Banks

Corporate Governance and Dividend Smoothing: Evidence from Pakistani Listed Banks

Dividend payout among Nigerian firms: Do female directors matters?

Board Accountability and Risk Taking in Banking: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment

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