Outsourcing the deep self: Deep self discordance does not explain away intuitions in manipulation arguments

Björnsson, Gunnar

doi:10.1080/09515089.2016.1150448

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…A first group set of studies tries to directly address the compatibility question, by investigating whether people think that an agent in a deterministic universe can be free and morally responsible. A second group indirectly addresses the question by studying whether people share the intuitions that serve as premise to philosophical arguments for and against the compatibility of free will with determinism, such as Frankfurt-style cases (Cova, 2014(Cova, , 2017Miller & Feltz, 2011) or Manipulation arguments (Björnsson, 2016;Cova, forthcoming;Feltz, 2013;Sripada, 2012). In this chapter, I focus on studies that try to directly address the compatibility question.…”

Section: Two Main Positions: Natural Compatibilism Vs Natural Incompatibilismmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Defense of Natural Compatibilism

Cova¹

2021

Preprint

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In this chapter, I survey the experimental philosophy literature on folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. I argue that the hypothesis that folk are natural compatibilists is a better fit and explanation of existing data than the hypothesis that folk are natural incompatibilists. I discuss the use of 'Throughpass' measures in the recent literature (arguing that these measures are inadequate) as well as experimental philosophers' reliance on mediation analysis and structural equation modelling to infer causality (arguing that this reliance is misguided).

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Section: Two Main Positions: Natural Compatibilism Vs Natural Incompatibilismmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Defense of Natural Compatibilism

Cova¹

2021

Preprint

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“…In considering the effects of determinism on consciousness, the most straightforward hypothesis is that determinism affects attributions of free will which, in turn, affect attributions of consciousness. Numerous studies have shown how determinism affects attributions of free will (see, e.g., Nahmias et al, 2007 ); however, there is considerable evidence that determinism affects related areas of agency attribution, such as attributions of decisions or deliberation ( Björnsson, 2014 ; Rose & Nichols, 2013 ) as well as attributions of an agent’s being the source of her own action ( Björnsson, 2016 ). There is also weak evidence suggesting that attributions of belief are affected ( Murray & Nahmias, 2014 ; for reasons to be skeptical, see Björnsson, 2014 ).…”

Section: Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinism and attributions of consciousness

Björnsson

Shepherd

2020

Philosophical Psychology

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The studies we report indicate that it is possible to manipulate explicit ascriptions of consciousness by manipulating whether an agent's behavior is deterministically caused. In addition, we explore whether this impact of determinism on consciousness is direct, or whether it is mediated by notions linked to agencynotions like moral responsibility, free will, deliberate choice, and sensitivity to moral reasons. We provide evidence of mediation. This result extends work on attributions of consciousness and their connection to attributions of agency by Adam Arico, Brian Fiala, and Shaun Nichols and supports it against recent criticisms.

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“…Chandra Sripada (2012) takes studies of his to suggest that people take manipulation to undermine responsibility because they take it to undermine certain compatibilist conditions. However, further studies undermine Sripada's interpretation of the data and provide contrary evidence in line with the current proposal (Björnsson 2016 substandard quality of will of the agent. In doing so, they prompt us to see his quality of will as, at best, a mere dependent variable.…”

Section: Figure 1 Explanatory Model (Grey Area) With Background Condmentioning

confidence: 55%

Explaining Away Epistemic Skepticism about Culpability

Björnsson¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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Recently, a number of authors have suggested that the epistemic condition on moral responsibility makes blameworthiness much less common than we ordinarily suppose, and much harder to identify. This paper argues that such epistemically based responsibility skepticism is mistaken. Section 2 sketches a general account of moral responsibility, building on the Strawsonian idea that blame and credit relates to the agent’s quality of will. Section 3 explains how this account deals with central cases that motivate epistemic skepticism and how it avoids some objections to quality of will accounts recently raised by Gideon Rosen. But an intuitive worry brought out by these objections remains. Section 4 spells out this remaining worry and argues that, like traditional metaphysical responsibility skepticism, it has its source in a non-standard explanatory perspective on action, suggesting that strategies for explaining away the intuitive pull of traditional skepticism are applicable in this case too.

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Outsourcing the deep self: Deep self discordance does not explain away intuitions in manipulation arguments

Cited by 9 publications

References 36 publications

A Defense of Natural Compatibilism

A Defense of Natural Compatibilism

Determinism and attributions of consciousness

Explaining Away Epistemic Skepticism about Culpability

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