Over the threshold: the politics of foreign policy in majoritarian parliamentary systems—the case of Britain

Abstract

Executive autonomy influences the ability of states to make credible commitments, utilise their domestic resources, and deter adversaries. In majoritarian parliamentary regimes it is often assumed that executive autonomy is derived from the possession of a substantial parliamentary majority, since this affords the government a 'buffer' in the legislature. Yet this understanding fails to account for the value of seats above the majority threshold for foreign policy, where the executive is constrained by internal dissent more than the non-passage of legislation. This article challenges the assumption of a linear relationship between seat share and executive autonomy through a theoretical re-examination of the politics of foreign policy in majoritarian parliamentary systems. It argues that possession of a significant majority can actually undermine the executive's foreign policy autonomy, since it increases the degree of intra-party factionalism without introducing corresponding benefits in the legislature. The argument is illustrated empirically through an examination of the politics of British foreign policy at three decisive elections (1950, 1955, and 1966) in the early Cold War period.

Party ideologies and UN debates

“…Though far from binding international commitments, UNGA speeches promise a (re)orientation of national foreign policy, for example, towards more development aid or towards a substantive reform of international institutions (Binder and Heupel 2020). Democratic government’s ability to implement those promises, and thus, its credibility at the international stage depends on the size of its parliamentary majority (e.g., Koch and Sullivan 2010; Martill 2018). Governments supported by an oversized majority in parliament find it easier to overcome intra-party dissent (e.g., König 2017), opposition by organized economic interests (e.g., Milner and Tingley 2011), adverse public opinion (e.g., Sobel 2001), or powerful veto players such as federal states and second chambers.…”