Overcoming methodological limitations in theory-of- mind neuroscientific experiments: A voxel based meta-analysis of verbal and non-verbal theory of mind studies

Abstract

Components of neuropsychological tests commonly employed by neuroimagers in developing a metric for Theory of Mind (ToM) research are currently extremely mixed. Tests commonly include factors which may be separate from the core ToM component such as emotion, morality and verbal skills. We explore these confounds, and hypothesize that the discrepant conclusions that have arisen in neuroimaging ToM research reflect the degree to which a task is confounded by these factors. To test this hypothesis we conduct a coordinate based activation likelihood estimations (ALE) meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies. The results demonstrate divergences in neuroimaging results are predicted by divergences in the use of verbal or non-verbal tasks. In response to this finding we systematically describe the main dimensions that should be excluded and included in an ideal ToM task drawing on the wide literature surveyed. We argue, good tasks should rely on minimum verbal content; avoid excessive empathic and moral reactions; include human-like figures executing purposeful behaviors; present several standardized phases, with increased levels of difficulty; and incorporate a clear scoring system, so that performance can be categorized. In order to try to accomplish these goals, we introduce the new 'Inverted Comic Strips Task'.

Commentary: Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It

“…One that has a proximity with Lavazza's approach says that a particular type of competence is instantiated because of specific P-states (not as them), which by that means makes them totally irreducible to any traditional dimension of intelligence. In defense of that view, which I endorse, consciousness can be functionally defined as an unparalleled type of bio-computational platform that allows second level information processing based on inferences of first order mental states, producing sophisticated and yet innate competences like meta-cognition and theory of mind (Metcalfe, 2008; Ando et al, 2013). Consciousness provides us with experiential continuity, while some of the most critical cognitive processes for planning and decision-making (which involve mapping future feelings over current experiences) and social coexistence (which involves mapping other's mental states over ours) comprise inferences that are made with that phenomenological texture as a base and could not be possible in a conscious free agent.…”