Overcoming the fear of commitment: Pre-electoral coalitions in Norway and Sweden

Abstract

In this article, we examine the occurrence of pre-electoral coalitions (PECs). Recent research points to when and why they are likely to occur, but these explanations are pitched at aggregate level, and they are less satisfying when applied to our particular cases. Rather than institutional or party-system features, we concentrate on the parties themselves -a level of analysis that raises theoretical and methodological challenges, which we discuss. Empirically, we investigate two cases of PEC in 2005-2006. One involved three Norwegian left-of-centre parties, the other involved four Swedish right-of-centre parties; both marked major departures from established behavioural patterns. We suggest certain conditions that may be necessary for a PEC to be formed. In particular, we argue that 'decisive' parties must prioritize office at the moment of decision, and that this preference order may be induced by some sort of environmental or intra-party stimulus.

How Polling Trends Influence Compensational Coalition-Voting

“…Moreover, the two established parties on either side of the left-right spectrum the Moderates (right-wing) and the Social Democrats (left-wing) have never joined a united coalition and have traditionally been the competing potential leaders of government (Oscarsson and Holmberg, 2013). This is a feature that distinguishes Sweden from similar proportional or mixed systems such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway, where there alternative versions of governments, such as for example grand coalitions, have been more common (Gschwend, 2007;Allern and Aylott, 2009;Irwin and van Holsteyn, 2012). Another important aspect is that smaller parties can be support parties to bigger parties even though they are not formally included in government (Bäck and Bergman, 2016).…”

“…This period was chosen in order to gain sufficient variation in the explanatory variable coalition signals. Before the 2006 general election, the four parties of the center-right decided for the first time to run as a unit in the pre-electoral coalition called the "Alliance" (Allern and Aylott, 2009). Heading toward the 2010 election, the left-socialist bloc followed their example and formed an explicit pre-electoral coalition, which led to a new strategic party context compared with the previous elections (Fredén, 2014).…”

“…When the parties are clear about whom they will collaborate with in government, it is often referred to as a "pre-electoral coalition" (see Golder, 2005;Allern and Aylott, 2009). These types of pre-electoral formations make coalitions more salient in relation to voters' preferences for parties (Falcó-Gimeno and Munez, 2017;Gschwend et al, 2017).…”

The Formation of Electoral Alliances in the Republic of Armenia: A Case Study of the 2017 Parliamentary Elections

“…A number of authors researching the formation of electoral alliances state that alliances form among ideologically compatible parties (Allern and Aylott, 2009;Debus, 2009;Gandhi and Reuter, 2013;Golder, 2006;Greene and Haber, 2016;Ibenskas, 2015;Kellam, 2015;Machado, 2009;Wahman, 2011). Some add to this that alliances among ideologically similar parties are more likely if they have prior experience of cooperation (Debus, 2009;Gandhi and Reuter, 2013;Greene and Haber, 2016;Ibenskas, 2015).…”

Question of Timing: Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Multiparty Presidential Regimes

“…Moreover, the relative shortage of studies dealing with pre-electoral coalitions in presidential countries runs counter to the current state-of-the-art on coalition theories. Research on coalitions under parliamentarism, for instance, has long paid attention to the issues related to pre-electoral coalitions (ALLERN and AYLOTT, 2009;DEBUS, 2009;GOLDER, 2006). Nonetheless, when A Adrián Albala & Lucas Couto (2023) 17 (1) e0001 -3/28…”