Overconfidence in case-study judgments.

Oskamp, Stuart

doi:10.1037/h0022125

Cited by 844 publications

(417 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

367

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…It is remarkable because the two alternatives are so salient. On the one hand, there are circumstances in which new information increases confidence more than accuracy, exacerbating overconfidence (Hall et al 2007, Heath and Gonzalez 1995, Oskamp 1965. On the other hand, there are other circumstances in which increasing expertise can increase accuracy faster than confidence, reducing overconfidence (Koriat et al 2002).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…However, some kinds of information increase confidence without increasing accuracy, and vice versa, even for experts (Griffin and Tversky 1992). As Oskamp (1965) memorably demonstrated, psychologists who learned more details of patients' life histories grew more confident in their diagnoses, without commensurate increases in accuracy. If additional information enhances confidence more than accuracy, it could drive up overconfidence (Deaves et al 2010).…”

Section: Effects Over Timementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Overconfidence affects the judgments of physicians (Oskamp 1965), entrepreneurs (Cooper et al 1988), bridge players (Keren 1987), government planners (Flyvbjerg et al 2002), investors (Statman et al 2006), and basketball players (Jagacinski et al 1977), to name but a few examples. Research has identified overconfidence in tests of declarative knowledge, bets, and predictions of the future (Ben-David et al 2013, Massey et al 2011.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Confidence Calibration in a Multi-year Geopolitical Forecasting Competition

Swift

Minster²,

Mellers³

et al. 2016

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This research examines the development of confidence and accuracy over time in the context of forecasting. Although overconfidence has been studied in many contexts, little research examines its progression over long periods of time or in consequential policy domains. This study employs a unique data set from a geopolitical forecasting tournament spanning three years in which thousands of forecasters predicted the outcomes of hundreds of events. We sought to apply insights from research to structure the questions, interactions, and elicitations to improve forecasts. Indeed, forecasters’ confidence roughly matched their accuracy. As information came in, accuracy increased. Confidence increased at approximately the same rate as accuracy, and good calibration persisted. Nevertheless, there was evidence of a small amount of overconfidence (3%), especially on the most confident forecasts. Training helped reduce overconfidence and team collaboration improved forecast accuracy. Together, teams and training reduced overconfidence to 1%. Our results provide reason for tempered optimism regarding confidence calibration and its development over time in consequential field contexts.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Effects Over Timementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Confidence Calibration in a Multi-year Geopolitical Forecasting Competition

Swift

Minster²,

Mellers³

et al. 2016

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…On the other hand, if the trader is not rational, then his or her subjective belief is parameterized by K j = K , where K is a nonnegative misperception parameter such that K = 1. Furthermore, a nonrational trader is overconfident if his or her subjective distribution is too tight, i.e., 0 ≤ K < 1, or underconfident if it is too loose, i.e., K > 1 (Oskamp (1965), Alpert and Raiffa (1959), Einhorn and Hogarth (1978)). …”

Section: Overconfidence In a Pairwise Contestmentioning

confidence: 99%

Overconfidence, Investor Sentiment, and Evolution

Wang¹

2001

Journal of Financial Intermediation

124

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We examine the survival of nonrational investors in an evolutionary game model with a population dynamic for a large economy. The dynamic indicates that the growth rate of wealth accumulation drives the evolutionary process. We focus our analysis on the survival of overconfidence and investor sentiment. We find that underconfidence or pessimism cannot survive, but moderate overconfidence or optimism can survive and even dominate, particularly when the fundamental risk is large. These findings provide new empirical implications for the survivability of active fund management. Our results lend support to the relevance of the psychology of investors in studying financial markets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G10, G14. C 2001 Academic Press

show abstract

“…Individuals often demonstrate inaccurate assessments of their environments, including their own abilities, payoffs, and probabilistic assessments. For example, people are frequently overconfident, with voluminous evidence suggesting that the ranks of the overconfident include judges (Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich, 2001), psychologists (Oskamp, 1965), physicians (Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead, 1981), engineers (Kidd, 1970), entrepreneurs (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999;Cooper et al, 1988), negotiators (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997), securities analysts (Froot and Frankel, 1989;De Bondt and Thaler, 1985), and managers (Russo and Schoemaker, 1992). In many experiments, subjects sacrifice personal payoffs to reward or punish others, or for purely altruistic reasons.Evidence also suggests that the nature of these departures may vary with the context or nature of interaction.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences

2006

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limiting distribution of preferences in general games, and apply our results to study the evolutionary emergence of overconfidence and interdependent preferences. We also show that this methodology can be adapted to cases where preferences are only imperfectly observed.

show abstract

Overconfidence in case-study judgments.

Cited by 844 publications

References 13 publications

Confidence Calibration in a Multi-year Geopolitical Forecasting Competition

Confidence Calibration in a Multi-year Geopolitical Forecasting Competition

Overconfidence, Investor Sentiment, and Evolution

The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About