Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law

Gersen, Jacob E.

doi:10.1086/655185

Cited by 30 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…A range of complementary mechanisms, however, exist as potential tools for political principals to control bureaucratic action. Restrictions on the appointment and removal of personnel Eisner and Meier 1990), ex ante review of proposed decisions by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (Bagley and Revesz 2006;Kagan 2001), legislative vetoes, and alterations in funding (Wood 1988(Wood , 1990 or jurisdiction (Gersen 2007;Macey 1992) are all potential mechanisms for political principals to control administrative agency behavior.…”

Section: A Political Control Of the Bureaucracymentioning

confidence: 99%

Agency Design and Distributive Politics

Gersen

Berry

2010

SSRN Journal

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This paper targets the intersection of two generally distinct literatures: political control of administrative agencies and distributive politics. Based on a comprehensive database of federal spending that tracks allocations from each agency to each congressional district for every year from 1984 through 2007, we analyze the responsiveness of agency spending decisions to presidential and congressional influences. Our research design uses district-by-agency fixed effects to identify the effects of a district's political characteristics on agency spending allocations. Because most agencies distribute federal funds, we are able to provide empirical evidence about the relationship between structural features of administrative agencies and the degree of political responsiveness of their spending decisions. Because allocation of funds constitutes a readily comparable metric over time and across agencies, we are able to evaluate a host of competing hypotheses about the political control of the bureaucracy by both Congress and the President.

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Section: A Political Control Of the Bureaucracymentioning

confidence: 99%

Agency Design and Distributive Politics

Gersen

Berry

2010

SSRN Journal

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“…While this idea of fragmentation has been in circulation for more than a quarter century, in recent years there has been a surge in scholarly interest in its causes and consequences (Biber ; Bradley ; Buzbee ; Freeman and Rossi ; Gersen ; Kagan ; Marisam ; Stephenson ; Ting ). In the domain of statutory policy, this work recognizes that fragmented legal frameworks for policy implementation are a function of legislative design, with legislators assigning roles and powers to actors and institutions that carry a law into effect.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Divided Government and the Fragmentation of American Law

Farhang

Yaver

2015

American J Political Sci

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We investigate institutional explanations for Congress's choice to fragment statutory frameworks for policy implementation. We argue that divided party government, which fuels legislative-executive conflict over control of the bureaucracy, motivates Congress to fragment implementation power as a strategy to enhance its control over implementation. We develop a novel measure of fragmentation in policy implementation, collect data on it over the period , and test hypotheses linking separation-of-powers structures to legislative design of fragmented implementation power. We find that divided party government is powerfully associated with fragmentation in policy implementation, and that this association contributed to the long-run growth of fragmentation in the postwar United States. We further find that legislative coalitions are more likely to fragment implementation power in the face of greater uncertainty about remaining in the majority.

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“…Thus, coordinated strategies and programs are needed, without which the uncoordinated overlapping jurisdictions can lead to conflicts or disagreements, inconsistencies and inaction, in management and in enforcement (Gersen, 2006).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislative enforcement affecting construction site safety in Malaysia

Rozanah

2016

Int. j. adv. appl. sci

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Construction industry is compelled to comply with the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 1994 and its Regulations made thereunder and the legislation laid down the duty holders' duties for the contractors and the subcontractors to ensure safety compliance at the project sites. The duty holders must take ownership of the outcome of the safety and health initiatives shouldered by them, including the contractual liability agreed upon in their contracts sealed for construction projects. In enforcing the OSHA 1994, the Department of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) is the enforcement authority given the power under the Act to carry out inspection and investigation upon occurrence of incidents at the workplaces. An important question raised by this paper focus on the enforcement and investigation of safety matters at the construction sites upon the amendment made to the CIDB Act 1994 that empowered CIDB to function into enforcement activities, disciplinary actions, prosecution action and penalty charges. The similar power of DOSH conferred on CIDB under the amended provisions would lead to duplication or overlapping instead of complementarity in nature and hence coordinated strategies and programs are obviously needed to overcome conflicts or disagreements and inconsistencies in managing the enforcement.

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Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law

Cited by 30 publications

References 55 publications

Agency Design and Distributive Politics

Agency Design and Distributive Politics

Divided Government and the Fragmentation of American Law

Legislative enforcement affecting construction site safety in Malaysia

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