Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks

Abstract

SummaryThis paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium and provide an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in the symmetric case. As an application, we establish an interesting link with the formation of networks. Abstract This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. KeywordsWe show the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium and provide an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in the symmetric case. As an application, we establish an interesting link with the formation of networks.

Overlapping coalition formation in game theory: A state-of-the-art review

“…Agbaglah (2017) modelled the OCSG problem within a non-cooperative network by developing a bargaining game, so-called a cover function game. A cover function game is shown by (𝑁, 𝑣, 𝑃) where 𝑁 is the set of agents, 𝑃 is the protocol of choosing both proposers and an ordering of respondents in the game, v is the value of the overlapping coalition which a partition function as an ordered pair (𝐶, 𝒞) in which C and 𝒞 indicate the overlapping coalition and other overlapping coalition structure, receptively.…”