2011
DOI: 10.1108/02637471111178137
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Ownership and size as predictors of incentive plans within Swedish real estate firms

Abstract: PurposeThis paper seeks to investigate the significance of ownership and firm size as predictors of the prevalence of incentive plans in Swedish real estate firms.Design/methodology/approachUsing survey data for two periods (2003 and 2007), a two‐predictor logistic model was fitted to the data to test the relationship between ownership and firm size and the likelihood that a Swedish real estate firm has an incentive plan.FindingsPrivate sector firms are more likely than government sector firms to use incentive… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Reconnecting to the previous research of incentives in the Swedish real estate industry we can conclude that we as Azasu (2011 and2009) state are left with incomplete contracts. But Azasu furthermore conclude that this imply measurable incentive schemes, something that is not found in this study.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Reconnecting to the previous research of incentives in the Swedish real estate industry we can conclude that we as Azasu (2011 and2009) state are left with incomplete contracts. But Azasu furthermore conclude that this imply measurable incentive schemes, something that is not found in this study.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Azasu (2011) conclude that to be able to motivate the real estate manager to perform in all of her tasks, quantifiable and non-quantifiable, incentive schemes need to be developed. Otherwise an incomplete contract is at hand.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…To some extent, this behaviour can be regulated through different incentive schemes or contracts (Williamson, 1981) depending on what the real estate owner (principal) wants the manger (agent) to prioritise. But as Azasu (2011) stated, the real estate manager’s work is multidimensional and consists of both tasks that are measurable and non-measurable yet just as important. This leaves us either with an incomplete contract or incentive scheme.…”
Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This behaviour can to some extent be regulated through different incentive schemes or contracts (Williamson, 1975) depending on what the real estate owner (principal) wants the manager (agent) to prioritise. But as Azasu (2011 and2009) states, the property manager's work is multidimensional and consist of tasks that are measurable as well as non-measurable but still important. This leaves us either with an incomplete contract or an incentive scheme.…”
Section: Incentives In Property Managementmentioning
confidence: 99%