2016
DOI: 10.1177/0972652716645893
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Ownership, Board Compensation and Company Performance in Sub-Saharan African Countries

Abstract: In countries with weak institutions, board governance becomes more important. This study uses a unique dataset from listed sub-Saharan African companies to examine the relationship between ownership composition and board compensation. It further analyses the association between board compensation and company performance. The findings indicate that board ownership and chief executive officer ownership are positively associated, whereas state ownership and concentrated ownership are negatively associated with bo… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(4 citation statements)
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References 76 publications
(121 reference statements)
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“…() stem from differences in legal institutions between Canada and less developed countries where MFIs typically operate. It is well‐documented in the governance literature that organizations need to focus on board governance when legal institutions are weak (Jensen , Munisi and Mersland ). Thus, we believe that our empirical setting, where legal frameworks play a minor role, is a good ground for testing theoretical differences between NPOs and FPOs.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…() stem from differences in legal institutions between Canada and less developed countries where MFIs typically operate. It is well‐documented in the governance literature that organizations need to focus on board governance when legal institutions are weak (Jensen , Munisi and Mersland ). Thus, we believe that our empirical setting, where legal frameworks play a minor role, is a good ground for testing theoretical differences between NPOs and FPOs.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A second instrument that helps to align agents' behavior with their principals' interests is governance structure. Board directors serve as a governing function, which translates into the interests of the shareholders [140]. Boards communicate shareholders' objectives and interests to managers and monitor them to keep agency costs in check [125].…”
Section: Agency Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…De Cesari and Ozkan (2015) and Michaely and Roberts (2011) suggest that share repurchases do not substitute for dividends and are used for a different purpose, such as when firms have cash flow problems. Munisi and Mersland (2016) studied PLCs in Sub-Saharan African countries and document that State ownership and other concentrated ownership are negatively associated with board compensation. Share repurchases are not common in Malaysia that enables us to focus solely on the dividend payout as the primary means to reduce agency conflicts in Malaysian PLCs.…”
Section: Ijmf 182mentioning
confidence: 99%