2016
DOI: 10.22495/cocv13i4c4p11
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Ownership structure and financial performance of small firms in Spain

Abstract: Ownership structure in companies are key to the performance, however, gaps still exist in the knowledge about the characteristics of ownership with financial performance. This study provides empirical evidence of the characteristics of ownership structure on firm’s performance. It examines 254 small and unlisted firms from the SABI database over the period 2000 to 2014. Using panel regression, the findings show that companies with family having majority ownership are more profitable and the market value such c… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Other school of thought claim that the most suitable instrument to correct the action of such sulphurous management behaviour is through concentrated ownership, (Ntoung et al 2017, p. 127). For instance, in (Ntoung et al 2016a) (Jensen and Meckling 1976;Sraer and Thesmar 2007) claim that separation between ownership and control can involveimportant costs and problems forshareholders. Their classical agency problem suggests that one way to resolve the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers is to increase the proportion of shares in the hands of the controlling shareholder.…”
Section: Family Control and Firm Valuementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Other school of thought claim that the most suitable instrument to correct the action of such sulphurous management behaviour is through concentrated ownership, (Ntoung et al 2017, p. 127). For instance, in (Ntoung et al 2016a) (Jensen and Meckling 1976;Sraer and Thesmar 2007) claim that separation between ownership and control can involveimportant costs and problems forshareholders. Their classical agency problem suggests that one way to resolve the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers is to increase the proportion of shares in the hands of the controlling shareholder.…”
Section: Family Control and Firm Valuementioning
confidence: 99%
“…No study so far has provided evidence for the risk profile of Spanish family firms. Meanwhile, other authors have tested ownership as endogenous to obtain theconclusion of there being no significant relationship using either a panel-fixed effect or instrumental variables" (Ntoung et al 2016a).…”
Section: Robustness Testmentioning
confidence: 99%
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