P-Consciousness presentation/A-Consciousness representation

Abstract

of the original article: Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses."Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on the phenomenon of blindsight. Some information about stimuli in the blind field is represented in the brains of blindsight patients, as shown by their correct "guesses." They cannot harness this information in the service of action, however, and this is said to show that a function of phenomenal consciousness is somehow to enable information represented in the brain to guide action. But stimuli in the blind field are both access-unconscious and phenomenally unconscious. The fallacy is: an obvious function of the machinery of access-consciousness is illicitly transferred to phenomenal consciousness. An example of access-consciousness without phenomenal consciousness?Joseph E. BogenDepartment of Neurological Surgery, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90033-4620.Abstract: Both Block and the commentators who accepted his P versus A distinction readily recognize examples of P without A but not vice versa. As an example of A without P, Block hypothesized a "zombie," computationally like a human but without subjectivity. This would appear to describe the disconnected right hemisphere of the split-brain subject, unless one alternatively opts for two parallel mechanisms for P?Block (1995a) makes a clear conceptual distinction between what he calls phenomenal consciousness (P) and what he calls access consciousness (A). The former (P) he points to by saying that "P-conscious states are experiential"; he gives examples such as smells, tastes, pains, thoughts, and desires (p. 230). The latter (A) he describes as a state in which some content is "poised for use as a premise in reasoning" and "poised for rational control of action" (p. 231). A can also be "poised for rational control of speech," but for Block this is not a necessary aspect because he considers chimps to have A. Indeed, he elsewhere notes that "very much lower animals are A-conscious" (p. 238). Block is at some pains to consider the possibilities of P without A and of A without P; in particular, he says, "It certainly seems conceptually possible that the neural bases of P-consciousness systems and A-consciousness systems are distinct" (p. 233). Block provides some possible examples of P without A (on p. 234 and p. 244) such as "becoming conscious" (acquiring A) of an ongoing noise (e.g., a pneumatic drill) some considerable time after one has been "aware of " or has been "experiencing" it. Although Block is reluctant to accept dreaming as an example of P without A (p. 275), some of us are inclined to a...

Vedanta as a Foundation Model of Mind Learning Patterns: An Introduction

“…Moreover, this subjectivity applies to the socially learned subconscious and unconscious mind states. This classification aligns with the explanation for neural patterns, which demonstrate the dynamic nature of mind learning, and supports the presence of A (access; adulthood mind) and P (phenomenal; childhood mind) consciousness (Gamble 1997). It also accounts for cognitive blind spots during periods of self-unawareness due to the presence of the childhood mind.…”