In the face of China's seemingly inexorable rise, how fearful are the key actors in Northeast Asia? Relatedly, how fearful are they likely to be in the future? The academic debate on these questions is characterized by starkly contrasting answers. A typology of the literature is developed whereby analysts are categorized under the rubric of fear deflation, fear inflation, and fear qualification. Through an analysis of empirical survey data and developments during the 2000-2010 period, this article contends that the most appropriate way to characterize Northeast Asian responses to China's rise is via the lens of qualified fear. Through it, one can see that the states on China's periphery are -contrary to the arguments of fear deflaters -exhibiting qualified fear at how China's rising great powers capabilities are wielded. At the same time, levels of fear have not, and arguably will not, escalate to levels posited in the fear-inflation perspective.