Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding

Bloom, Mia

doi:10.2307/20202305

Cited by 294 publications

(190 citation statements)

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“…Second, though Qassams are not particularly effective at killing Israelis, they do cause significant psychological distress among Israelis (though not incurring a military response from Israel in the period under investigation, discussed below), which is mirrored in the strong political and public response to the rocket attacks in Israel (3, 7). A related possibility is that rocket attacks are used by Palestinian factions (particular extremist ones) to solidify their position and reputation among the Palestinian population (31)(32)(33)9). Finally, attacks may be used to affect political opinion in Israel (34-36), cause economic damage to Israel (37,38), or, more generally, to derail the peace process (12,39).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Both sides retaliate in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Haushofer

Biletzki

Kanwisher

2010

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Ending violent international conflicts requires understanding the causal factors that perpetuate them. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israelis and Palestinians each tend to see themselves as victims, engaging in violence only in response to attacks initiated by a fundamentally and implacably violent foe bent on their destruction. Econometric techniques allow us to empirically test the degree to which violence on each side occurs in response to aggression by the other side. Prior studies using these methods have argued that Israel reacts strongly to attacks by Palestinians, whereas Palestinian violence is random (i.e., not predicted by prior Israeli attacks). Here we replicate prior findings that Israeli killings of Palestinians increase after Palestinian killings of Israelis, but crucially show further that when nonlethal forms of violence are considered, and when a larger dataset is used, Palestinian violence also reveals a pattern of retaliation: (i) the firing of Palestinian rockets increases sharply after Israelis kill Palestinians, and (ii) the probability (although not the number) of killings of Israelis by Palestinians increases after killings of Palestinians by Israel. These findings suggest that Israeli military actions against Palestinians lead to escalation rather than incapacitation. Further, they refute the view that Palestinians are uncontingently violent, showing instead that a significant proportion of Palestinian violence occurs in response to Israeli behavior. Well-established cognitive biases may lead participants on each side of the conflict to underappreciate the degree to which the other side's violence is retaliatory, and hence to systematically underestimate their own role in perpetuating the conflict.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Both sides retaliate in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Haushofer

Biletzki

Kanwisher

2010

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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“…10 Given the range of options available to rebels to manage their rivalries, why do some turn to fratricide? Few have taken on this puzzle directly.…”

Section: The Spectrum Of Competitive Factionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fratricidal Rebels: Ideological Extremity and Warring Factionalism in Civil Wars

Hafez

2017

Terrorism and Political Violence

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Why do rebels kill each other? When confronting a formidable regime, rebels often descend into warring factionalism rather than forge unity across their ranks to reap the advantages of cooperation. This article tackles the puzzle of inter-rebel fratricide. It explores power and resource competition arguments, and contrasts them with ideological mechanisms that can drive inter-rebel violence. It argues that ideological extremity is central to rebel fratricide. Rebel organizations with common ideological origins can still compete with each other based on their degree of centrism and extremism, making them ideologically distant. This proximity-distance paradox makes their cohabitation mutually threatening. Ideological challengers from the same family tree are particularly threatening to one's group cohesion, and if successful, guarantee one's political marginalization within the broader movement. Extremist groups are likely to respond to these threats with fratricide, while ideologically centrist ones will rely on other strategies such as balancing, outbidding, or defecting to manage their rivalries. Algeria's civil war, 1992-2002, is a plausibility probe case study that illustrates these causal mechanisms. The study contributes to a burgeoning literature on the role of ideology in armed civil conflicts.

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“…In contrast, Bloom (2004) Kaplan et al (2005), who proposed a "terror stock" model and examine how targeted killings and pre-emptive arrests influence the subsequent recruitment of terror operatives. They find that targeted killings of Palestinians serve to increase, while pre-emptive arrests reduce the stock of potential terrorists.…”

Section: Previous Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Kaplan, Mintz, and Mishal (2006) respectively. In particular, we test Bloom's (2004) assertion that the Palestinians and Israeli's are engaged in a perpetual causal tit-for-tat cycle of suicide attacks and targeted killing reprisals.…”

Section: Previous Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…11 All standard errors in the paper at heteroskedasticity-consistent and estimated using White's (1980) We also analyze the effect of suicide attacks on Palestinian fatalities in targeted killings, rather than on the total number of Palestinian fatalities. This allows us to shed light on the hypothesis that suicide attacks and targeted killings are linked to each other in an unending causal loop (Bloom, 2004). Moreover, fatalities in targeted killings are the outcome of a deliberate action initiated by Israel (as opposed to other Palestinian fatalities, that may occur as a result of violence initiated by the Palestinians themselves), and therefore are more directly informative about Israel's strategic reaction to Palestinian violence.…”

Section: Israeli Reaction To Suicide Attacks and Other Palestinianmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Shape of Things to Come? On the Dynamics of Suicide Attacks and Targeted Killings

Jaeger

Paserman

2009

QJPS

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In this paper we examine the dynamics of suicide attacks and targeted killings in the Second Intifada. We find evidence that the targeted killings of Palestinian leaders by Israel reduce realized Palestinian violence. We find, however, that intended Palestinian violence is increasing at low levels of targeted killings, but decreasing at higher levels. We find that suicide bombings that kill at least one Israeli lead to a subsequent increase in the incidence and levels of Palestinian fatalities. Our results do not support the notion that suicide attacks and targeted killings follow the "tit-for-tat" pattern that is commonly postulated in the literature.Keywords: suicide terrorism, targeted killings, assassinations, Second Intifada, Palestinians, Israel 1 Unlike a conventional war involving ground or air combat on a battlefield between nation-states with armies of (roughly) equal capacity fighting to claim territory, several recent conflicts have taken place in populated civilian areas between groups with substantial differences in military capacity. These conflicts may include targeted killings (assassinations) of specific leaders on one side and suicide attacks on other -policies primarily designed to incapacitate or demoralize the opponent rather than to directly claim territory. In both cases, civilians are either deliberately targeted (as with suicide attacks) or are likely to be killed in the process (as with targeted killings). This kind of decentralized, somewhat sporadic, and clearly psychologically oriented warfare may be one of the defining characteristics of many of the conflicts of the 21st century.In the long-standing conflict between the Palestinians and Israel, the Second Intifada has been characterized by the increased use of suicide attacks by the Palestinians and an increased number of Israeli targeted killings of Palestinian militants of all ranks. Nearly half of the over 1,000 Israeli fatalities in the Second Intifada have been caused by suicide attacks, while about 8 percent of more than 4,100 Palestinian fatalities have occurred during targeted killings. Of these, nearly 40 percent were not the targeted individual(s).1 While neither of these tactics was introduced during the Second Intifada, 2 their heightened prevalence has resulted in their being perceived as the defining characteristics of the conflict. Palestinian violence increases when one moves from zero to one or two targeted killings per month, but then decreases at higher levels.In the next section we discuss the previous literature on suicide terrorism and targeted killings. We then briefly discuss our empirical approach. In Section III we describe our data on violence and intended violence. In Section IV we discuss the prevalence of suicide attacks among overall Israeli fatalities and the prevalence of targeted killings among all Palestinian fatalities. In Section V, we estimate the Israeli reaction to realized and intended suicide attacks by the Palestinians. We examine realized Palestinian reactions to targeted killings...

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Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding

Cited by 294 publications

References 1 publication

Both sides retaliate in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Both sides retaliate in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Fratricidal Rebels: Ideological Extremity and Warring Factionalism in Civil Wars

The Shape of Things to Come? On the Dynamics of Suicide Attacks and Targeted Killings

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